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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the ways in which various constitutional 
structures grant and constrain emergency powers.  Specifically, the 
Article examines how a country defines the emergency powers of its 
chief executive and whether that definition is formal or informal.  
The Article also explores what effect the distinction between formal 
and informal powers has on a constitutional system’s ability to 
prevent a devolution of constitutional norms.  The Article 
undertakes this inquiry by examining the use of emergency powers 
in different countries and at different times.  It examines the 
constitutions of Germany’s Weimar Republic, Charles de Gaulle’s 
Fifth French Republic, and Indira Gandhi’s rule in India, as well as 
specific examples from United States history.  While there are 
comparative aspects to this exploration, this is not a truly 
comparative piece of scholarship.  Rather, it is a series of case studies 
aimed at identifying the advantages and disadvantages of the 
United States’ constitutional treatment of emergency powers.  The 
Article also attempts to highlight recurring patterns, such as 
legislative inaction, that lead to democratic devolution in 
constitutional systems.  This Article ultimately takes the position 
that while an informal system of emergency powers, like that used 
in the United States, provides the flexibility necessary for a 
constitutional government to address legitimate emergencies 
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without permanently stretching the separation of powers needed to 
limit executive overreach, this system can only function if an 
executive is sufficiently guided by informal constraints and 
sanctions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 16, 2017, Turkish voters went to the polls and approved 
a referendum significantly changing their country’s constitution.1  
The main thrust of the amendment was to provide President Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan sweeping new powers.2  Although he had acted as 
the leader of the Government since 2014, President Erdogan had no 
constitutional authority to do so.3  Rather, the Turkish Constitution 
envisioned an “impartial [President] without full executive 
authority.”4  One of these new powers included the sole authority to 
declare states of emergency or to dismiss a sitting parliament.5  This 
concentration of power in the hands of a president who had, over 
the past eighteen months, fired or suspended over 130,000 people 
and arrested another 45,000 in response to a failed coup attempt,6 
made many observers nervous that Turkey would slip inevitably 
into dictatorship.7 
In February 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping moved to 
consolidate power within the Communist party. 8   President Xi 
successfully proposed eliminating presidential term limits, in effect 
paving the way for “upending a model of collective leadership that 
was put in place after the excesses of one-man rule” that plagued the 
Chinese government after its inception.9  This action followed on the 
 
 1  Mark Lowen, Why Did Turkey Hold a Referendum?, BBC (Apr. 16, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38883556 [https://perma.cc/9L7L-
2LU8].  
 2 Id. 
 3 Patrick Kingsley, Erdogan Claims Vast Powers in Turkey After Narrow Victory 
in Referendum, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/world/europe/turkey-referendum-poll
s-erdogan.html [https://perma.cc/QD7A-KF9N]. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Lowen, supra note 1. 
 6 Kingsley, supra note 3. 
 7 Lowen, supra note 1. 
 8 Salvatore Babones, Leader for Life: Xi Jinping Strengthens Hold on Power as 
China Communist Party Ends Term Limits, FORBES (Feb. 25, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/salvatorebabones/2018/02/25/leader-for-life-xi-
jinping-strengthens-hold-on-power-as-china-communist-party-ends-term-limits/
#3759c18ce466 [https://perma.cc/X4DN-QNUS]. 
 9 Austin Ramzy, President Xi Jinping’s Rise in China, as Covered by The Times, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-career-highlights
.html [https://perma.cc/F2NW-NCWL].  
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heels of the Chinese party “enshrin[ing] ‘Xi Jinping Thought on 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in a New Era’ in the 
constitution,” a move described in the press as “elevat[ing] 
President Xi Jinping to the same status as . . . Mao Zedong and Deng 
Xiaoping.”10 
A year later, in February 2019, President Donald Trump declared 
that a national emergency existed at the U.S.-Mexican border.11  He 
then announced that he was using the authority granted to the 
President by the National Emergency Act of 1976,12 to order that 
funds be allocated to build a wall along the border, to address the 
declared emergency. 13   This announcement followed the longest 
government shutdown in U.S. history, a shutdown precipitated in 
no small part by Congress’ unwillingness to appropriate money for 
a border wall.14  When congressional leaders and members of the 
press questioned the legality of President Trump’s actions, he 
announced that he believed he had the “absolute right” to declare a 
National Emergency. 15   Journalists, pundits, commentators, and 
scholars responded with varying degrees of criticism or support for 
the President’s actions reigniting a debate on presidential 
emergency powers that has surfaced repeatedly.16  Many questioned 
 
 10 Simon Denyer, China’s Leader Elevated to the Level Mao in Chinese Communist 
Pantheon, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-leader-elevated-to-the-level-of
-mao-in-communist-pantheon/2017/10/24/ddd911e0-b832-11e7-9b93-b97043e57
a22_story.html [https://perma.cc/57XT-7VKR]. 
 11 Jordan Fabian, Trump Declares National Emergency at Border, HILL (Feb. 15, 
2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/430092-trump-signs-
emergency-declaration-for-border [https://perma.cc/DZ8L-72EJ]. 
 12 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1601 et seq. (West 2016). 
 13 Damian Paletta, Mike DeBonis, & John Wagner, Trump Declares National 
Emergency on Southern Border in Bid to Build Wall, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-border-emergency-the-presi
dent-plans-a-10-am-announcement-in-the-rose-garden/2019/02/15/f0310e62-311
0-11e9-86ab-5d02109aeb01_story.html [https://perma.cc/R38C-SSK5]. 
 14 See id. 
 15 Catherine Lucey, Trump Says He Has ‘Absolute Right’ to Declare Emergency, 
CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-
trump-border-wall-emergency-20190219-story.html [https://perma.cc/8V97-
6EGR]. 
 16 See, e.g., Elizabeth Goitein, The Alarming Scope of the President’s Emergency 
Powers, ATLANTIC (Jan/Feb 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidential-emergen
cy-powers/576418/ [https://perma.cc/WPR9-JNL7]. 
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not only the existence of an actual emergency but also whether the 
President himself truly believed that an emergency existed.17 
Both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, 
employing procedures from the National Emergency Act, voted to 
block the President’s emergency declaration.18  This was the first 
time in the Act’s history that Congress had attempted such action.19  
And while the resolution attracted some support from Republican 
legislators, it did not command the two thirds support necessary to 
override President Trump’s veto and the declaration remained in 
place.20 
The Trump Administration’s decision to invoke the statutory 
powers granted to the President by Congress, for a purpose 
specifically rejected by Congress, sparked significant debate and 
commentary.  This Article, however, proposes a broader look at the 
use of executive emergency powers beyond those canonized by 
statute.  This Article examines the ways in which a country’s 
constitutional structure may grant or deny emergency powers to its 
Executive and what methods of shaping emergency powers have 
been more successful.  Specifically, this Article looks at the 
distinction between “formal” and “informal” grants of emergency 
power. 
The idea of the archetypical strong man as a necessity to 
successfully navigate troubled times in a nation’s life span has a long 
history.  From tribal leaders, to kings, to dictators, the rule of one has 
been a recurring theme in human government.  The question this 
 
 17 See, e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes a 
Constitutional Clash, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national-emergency-trump.
html [https://perma.cc/7JTF-LQU5].  Critics argued that President Trump “may 
have undercut his own argument that the border situation was so urgent that it 
required emergency action.  ‘I didn’t need to do this, but I’d rather do it much 
faster,’ he said.  ‘I just want to get it done faster, that’s all.’”  Id.  
 18 Jacob Pramuk, Trump Tweets ‘VETO!’ After Senate Votes to Block His Border 
Emergency Declaration, CNBC (Mar. 14, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/14/senate-votes-to-block-trump-border-wall-n
ational-emergency-declaration.html [https://perma.cc/7WQR-Q7D4].  
 19  Sarah Binder, The Senate Voted to Block Trump’s National Emergency 
Declaration. Now What?, WASH POST (March 15, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/15/senate-voted-block-tru
mps-national-emergency-declaration-now-what/ [https://perma.cc/6JTB-FP86]. 
 20  Michael Tackett, Trump Issues First Veto After Congress Rejects Border 
Emergency, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/us/politics/trump-veto-national-emerg
ency.html [https://perma.cc/7ERF-7JQQ]. 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss2/1
2020] Executives in Crisis 347 
Article seeks to explore is what happens when a government 
designed to prevent the rise of a strongman, such as a constitutional 
democracy or republic, faces the type of external or internal crises 
that seem tailor-made for the strong hand of a dictator?  How have 
other constitutional governments handled such situations and what 
type of constitutional system has been most successful in both 
navigating crises and restraining the rise of a dictator?  Is a 
constitutional system which explicitly allows for the suspension of 
constitutional restraints in the face of an emergency better able to 
cope with crisis than one that makes no such exceptions?  And, 
alternatively, which system rebounds to a proper constitutional 
order more effectively when the crisis has passed?  This Article 
attempts to explore these questions by looking at the actual 
experiences of four separate constitutional governments in crisis:  
Weimar Germany, 21  France’s Fifth Republic, 22  Indira Gandhi’s 
India, 23  and the United States during the Civil War, 24  the Great 
Depression, World War II,25 and the War on Terror.26 
Before beginning the analysis, it is important to note what this 
paper is not.  It is not a comparative constitutional study, in the true 
sense of those words.  I am not and do not pretend to be a 
comparativist.  Much of the documentation I have relied upon for 
non-English sources are translations, which means that any nuanced 
analysis of language is hindered by those translations.  Nor does this 
Article seek to recommend a “best” solution for the constitutional 
questions explored.  Rather, it seeks to explore the strengths and 
weaknesses that have emerged in different constitutional designs 
when various countries have undergone extremely volatile 
situations. 
Instead of being a truly comparative analysis, this Article is 
primarily aimed at examining why the United States has not, over 
its two-hundred-and-forty-year history, devolved into a true 
dictatorship and what effect the lack of a formal, emergency power 
“safety valve” has had on the role of the U.S. President over time.  
Accordingly, the countries examined in this Article were not chosen 
because they are representative of different styles of constitutional 
 
 21 See infra Part III. 
 22 See infra Part IV. 
 23 See infra Part V. 
 24 See infra Section VI.a. 
 25 See infra Section VI.b. 
 26 See infra Section VI.c. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
348 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:2 
systems.  Rather, the examples of Weimar Germany, the French Fifth 
Republic, and Indira Gandhi’s India were chosen because the 
constitutions in place at the time each of these countries faced 
significant national emergencies included explicit emergency 
powers provisions and, in each one, the use of those emergency 
powers allowed a dictatorial regime to come to power, at least 
temporarily.  This Article will contrast these experiences with those 
of the United States (whose Constitution lacks any explicit 
emergency powers clause) and evaluate whether the United States 
would have been better off had its constitution allowed for the 
temporary suspension of constitutional constraints. 
It is also important to note that this Article does not claim that 
the existence of explicit constitutional emergency powers always 
leads to “executive domination” or that such a constitutional 
provision is the only reason why such “constitutional dictatorships” 
emerged in the countries analyzed. 27   Rather, it focuses on the 
narrow question of whether explicit or implicit emergency power 
regimes provide a better check against tyranny.  Ultimately, this 
Article contends that while both systems can be manipulated to 
expand executive power, an implicit model such as the U.S. 
Constitution has proven to be less susceptible to being used to 
extend an individual’s hold on power.  This conclusion comes with 
a significant caveat:  because an implied system of emergency 
powers makes no formal distinction between the powers that can be 
exercised within and without the confines of any particular 
emergency, many of the restrictions in place in an implied system 
rely on a respect for informal methods of checking institutional 
power. 
Part II briefly surveys the literature surrounding constitutional 
dictatorship.  This will help provide context for the country-specific 
analysis to follow.  Parts III-V will examine the use of emergency 
powers in Weimar Germany, the French Fifth Republic, and Indira 
Gandhi’s India, as well as provide some context regarding the crisis 
situations which allowed these governments to justify the use of 
emergency powers.  These Parts will also look at the aftermath of 
 
 27 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 605, 616 (2003) (“Many constitutions contain explicit provisions for 
emergency powers, either in text or in judicial doctrine.  Sometimes executive 
domination has overtaken the relevant polities, sometimes it has not; other 
variables probably dominate, such as the nation’s stage of development, or its 
susceptibility to economic shocks, or the design of legislative and judicial 
institutions.” (footnote omitted)). 
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emergency power use, primarily focusing on the ways in which 
executive power was affected.  Part VI will recount the ways in 
which the U.S. President used the executive power when faced with 
substantial crises, focusing on Abraham Lincoln during the Civil 
War, Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the Great Depression and 
World War II, and George W. Bush during the War on Terror.  Part 
VII will argue that including an emergency powers provision in a 
constitution invites executive overreach—especially as a means to 
maintain political powers—and is unnecessary to enable a 
constitutional democracy to respond to national crises.  It will also 
analyze the resulting effects on executive power and explore 
whether informal expansions of power have a greater lasting effect 
than formal suspensions of constitutional protections.  The Article 
then briefly concludes. 
II. EMERGENCY POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP:  A 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW  
The question of whether a constitutional democracy can survive 
a crisis without sacrificing the ideals enshrined in its constitution has 
plagued constitutional drafters and theorists alike. 28   In the 
immediate aftermath of World War II scholars such as Clinton 
Rossiter questioned the very possibility that a constitutional 
democracy could survive without a properly structured emergency 
system, which he termed a “constitutional dictatorship.”29  While 
various arguments emerged in the subsequent three quarters of a 
century, the core component of this inquiry still remains an 
important topic among constitutional designers and scholars. 
But what is the import of all this theoretical discussion?  Why 
has it so fascinated scholars of constitutional design and 
comparative constitutionalism alike?  What is the significance of this 
dilemma?  The question is really one of the legality of emergency 
 
 28  See, e.g., Benjamin A. Kleinerman, “In the Name of National Security”: 
Executive Discretion and Congressional Legislation in the Civil War and World War II, in 
THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 91, 92 (Jeffrey K. Tulis & Stephen 
Macedo eds., 2010) (“[H]ow best does a constitutional republic respond to threats 
to its existence?  Should it legalize those new powers that have now become 
necessary?  Or should it merely exercise these powers outside the legal order during 
the seemingly temporary and extraordinary security threat?”). 
 29 CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN 
THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948). 
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action:  Can a constitution adapt or “stretch” to fit the needs 
necessary for its own survival?  Or must it be altered to avoid losing 
legitimacy?  And if it can stretch, what mechanisms must be in place 
to shrink executive powers back to their proper place?  Or, if it must 
be changed, how can a constitution that needs to be altered to 
survive an emergency avoid alteration that defeats the entire 
constitutional purpose? 
As might be imagined, these questions have been tackled in 
countless ways by countless scholars with countless different views.  
This Article does not attempt to provide a definitive answer to these 
questions, nor is it intended to add yet another voice to this 
voluminous discussion.  Rather, it will look at a selection of real-
world experiences with various forms of constitutional emergency 
powers and attempt to draw a few modest conclusions about our 
own constitutional mechanisms for responding to external and 
internal emergencies.  While this Article is not, primarily, a 
theoretical discussion, it is necessary to frame the theoretical 
landscape in order to make the most of the historical examples that 
follow. 
First, we must define what we mean by “emergency powers.”  
For purposes of this Article emergency powers are the tools that are 
available to a constitutional government when faced with varying 
crises.  These may be expressly allowed by constitutional provisions 
designed to be triggered only in the case of an emergency,30 or they 
may be implied by vague or ambiguous language designed to be in 
effect at all times.31  Examples of the “explicit” brand of emergency 
powers that will be discussed in this Article are the state of 
emergency provided for in Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution,32 
the “state of siege” in France’s Fifth Republic,33 and the emergency 
powers provision in the Indian Constitution. 34   “Implicit” 
emergency power is exemplified by the ways in which the U.S. 
 
 30 See infra Parts III-VI. 
 31 See infra Section VII.c. 
 32 See infra Part III. 
 33 See infra Part IV. 
 34 See infra Part V. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss2/1
2020] Executives in Crisis 351 
President has used his “Commander-in-Chief” powers 35  and the 
equally ill-defined “executive power” vested by Article II.36 
While both types of emergency powers have proven effective in 
the face of nation-threatening emergencies, they also each present 
their own unique dangers.  While explicit emergency powers are 
typically accompanied by constitutionalized protective measures, if 
those measures fail, explicit powers allow for the suspension of 
constitutional protections which can allow the executive to exercise 
essentially dictatorial powers.  Implicit constitutional powers, by 
contrast, must remain within the constitutional structure.  The ways 
in which executive power can be stretched, however, may not be 
clearly defined which may in turn lead to a gradual expansion of 
executive powers as each crisis expands the executive without an 
equal and opposite rebound effect at the end of the crisis.  The 
remainder of this Part will lay out some of the key points that mark 
the boundaries of the scholarly debate on implicit versus explicit 
emergency powers before the Article turns its attention to a more 
focused look at the experiences of individual countries. 
a. Theoretical Frameworks 
Professor Jules Lobel has provided a useful, if perhaps overly-
simplified, breakdown of the views regarding constitutional 
emergency powers, dividing the arguments into three main 
frameworks:  Absolutist, Relativist, and Liberalist.37  According to 
Professor Lobel, absolutists argue that there are no emergency 
powers outside a country’s written constitution, and they point to 
existing constitutional provisions as evidence that no others are 
available.38  This position essentially boils down to the idea that the 
powers granted in the Constitution are sufficient to protect the 
nation even in emergencies; but if they turn out to be inadequate, 
suspending protections of individual rights is not worth the cost to 
 
 35 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of 
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, 
when called into the actual service of the United States . . . .”). 
 36 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America.”). 
 37 Jules Lobel, Comment, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE 
L.J. 1385, 1386-92 (1989). 
 38 Id. at 1386-87. 
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constitutional government.39  This view of constitutional powers is 
dangerously close to the “suicide pact” critiqued by Professor 
Michael Stokes Paulsen,40 and would threaten the survival of nearly 
any constitutional democracy.  While this view has some support in 
the legal academy, it is not widely accepted by judicial or executive 
actors. 
By contrast, relativists “argue[] that the Constitution is a flexible 
document that permits the President to take whatever measures are 
necessary in crisis situations.”41  This relativist position seems to be 
the one that has been most widely accepted by U.S. Presidents.  
Lincoln’s defense of his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus that 
it was necessary that “all the laws but one” should be enforced to 
ensure the survival of the country aligns with the relativist 
position. 42   Similarly Professor Lobel highlights that “President 
Franklin Roosevelt articulated the [relativist] view that the President 
has the constitutional power to ignore statutory provisions when 
‘necessary to avert a disaster which would interfere with the 
winning of the war.’”43 
Scholarly support for the relativist position can go too far, 
sometimes appearing to contend that any executive action to combat 
a national emergency is constitutional provided that it does not 
provoke a response from the other branches of government.  
Professor Paulsen, for example, seems to take this approach by 
locating implied emergency powers within the Presidential oath to 
“preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United 
 
 39 Id. at 1387. 
 40 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1257, 1258-59 (2004) (“The alternative [to locating implicit emergency powers in the 
U.S. Constitution] is near-absurdity: that the parts should be construed, and given 
effect, even at the expense of preservation of the Constitution as a whole, with the 
logical consequence that adherence to the Constitution might require destruction 
of the Constitution.”). 
 41 Lobel, supra note 37, at 1388. 
 42 Abraham Lincoln, Address to Congress (July 4th, 1861); see also Letter from 
Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, to Albert G. Hodges, U.S. Senator 
(April 4, 1864) in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 585 (Don 
E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (“I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might 
become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution, 
through the preservation of the nation.”).  For a more complete discussion of 
Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus see infra Section VI.a. 
 43 Lobel, supra note 37, at 1388 (quoting E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND 
POWERS 250-51 (4th ed. 1957) (quoting Roosevelt’s Speech to Congress, September 
7, 1942)). 
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States.”44  Professor Paulsen’s argument that this broad reading of 
the Presidential Oath was its original understanding proves too 
much.  First, this focus on the power granted by the oath overlooks 
the obligation imposed by it.  One could just as easily argue that the 
Constitution, which the President must preserve, protect, and 
defend, requires the President to preserve it “intact.”  In other 
words, if the Constitution must be violated to the extent that it no 
longer protects its own inherent central tenants and ideals to 
“preserve” the Union, the oath has already been violated. 
Moreover, Professor Paulsen places the obligation to control 
executive power on the other branches of government, writing: 
Both the judiciary, through the power of constitutional 
interpretation it possesses in deciding cases arising under the 
Constitution, and the Congress, through the power of 
constitutional interpretation it possesses in exercising its 
legislative powers and the check of impeachment, have a 
duty of independent constitutional review over the 
judgment of necessity.45 
This position, however, ignores important separation of powers 
principles.  By arguing that the President can exercise whatever 
power he wants until the other branches step in, Professor Paulsen 
is implicitly arguing that either the executive can exercise powers 
which it does not constitutionally possess, or that the judicial and 
legislative branches can, by taking affirmative actions, restrict the 
use of constitutionally permissible executive power.  The logical end 
of this argument is that there is no limit placed on the executive by 
the Constitution and the outer extent of the executive power is 
simply as much as he can get away with before Congress and the 
Courts step in. 
Finally, Professor Paulsen perhaps overlooks the Framers’ 
understanding that they were engaging in a “first-of-its-kind” 
experiment.  In the context of a “national experiment,” it might be 
acceptable for the experiment to fail if it could not protect the 
Lockean ideals on which the country was founded.  While this does 
not mean that a reasonable mind could not find the language of the 
oath broad enough to support the meaning urged by Professor 
 
 44 Paulsen, supra note 40, at 1258 (“In short, the Constitution either creates or 
recognizes a constitutional law of necessity, and appears to charge the President with 
the primary duty of applying it and judging the degree of necessity in the press of 
circumstances.”). 
 45 Id. at 1259. 
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Paulsen, it does undermine his claim that the Framers intended the 
oath to carry such significance. 
Professor Lobel’s third and final classification attempts to split 
the difference between the absolutists and the relativists.  His 
liberalists (which refers to the traditional idea of “liberal 
constitutionalism”) recognize a distinction between “normal” and 
“crisis” times for purposes of government.46  Under the liberalist 
model, a constitution does not contain the elasticity championed by 
the relativist framework.47   Those exercising executive authority, 
however, may act outside of the constitutional framework if an 
emergency situation necessitates such action.48  A key component of 
the liberalist framework is that the executive must acknowledge that 
it is acting without legal or constitutional authority. 49   In such 
situations, officials could be sued in court for their actions and held 
liable even if the actions were deemed necessary.  The legislature 
could then indemnify the official for such actions if it believed that 
the official had acted properly, even though unconstitutionally.50  
Professor Lobel argues that this was the initial view of emergency 
powers held by the Framers.51 
An important distinction between the liberalist and relativist 
models is that while the extent of “allowable” executive action may 
be similar in both frameworks, the liberalist model would recognize 
that action as illegal or unconstitutional and would hold the 
executive liable, while the relativist would deem such actions to be 
fully legal and constitutional provided they were necessary to 
confront the emergency.  An in-depth inquiry into which of these 
models may be “best” for an implied emergency powers regime is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  Rather, this overview attempts to 
merely delineate the theoretical battlegrounds and provide the 
reader with a digestible way of approaching some of the important 
questions that are raised in the literature and discussed below. 
 
 46 Lobel, supra note 37, at 1388. 
 47 Id. at 1388-89.  
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 1389-90 (“Courts could impose personal liability on those executive 
officials who undertook unconstitutional actions, even when such officials acted 
pursuant to good faith motivations to defuse a crisis.  Subsequent to a court's 
declaration of the unlawfulness of an exercise of emergency power, however, 
Congress could decide to indemnify the official if it believed the official's actions 
really were justified by extreme necessity.”). 
 50 Id. at 1390. 
 51 Id. 
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b. Key Questions:  Ratcheting, Toggling, and Legality 
Considering the basic framework outlined in the preceding 
Section, this Section will examine a few of the key questions that 
continue to predominate the academic discussion.  The first point of 
contention in this debate that is essential to this Article’s analysis is 
whether executive power under an implicit emergency powers 
system experiences a “ratcheting effect.”52  That is, whether each 
expansion of executive power in the face of a national crisis results 
in a permanent expansion of the role of the executive.  Or does 
executive power ebb and flow in parallel with the crisis?  Future 
Judge Scott Matheson described this idea in his 2009 book as a 
repeating pattern, writing that:  “The pattern in a crisis often is 
executive action, legislative acquiescence, and judicial tolerance that 
reflects the institutional characteristics of the branches.”53 
Professor Kim Lane Scheppele, focuses on this question of 
elasticity in an implied emergency powers system like the United 
States and argues that such a system allows the executive to 
gradually move the “baseline” of executive power.54  She bases this 
argument on a theory of “small emergencies”55 and posits that the 
United States has been operating under an emergency government 
since the end of World War I.56  The danger in this type of emergency 
power structure is that with each “small” emergency, executive 
power is expanded and the end of a small emergency does not result 
in a concomitant reduction in the scope of executive power.  This 
 
 52 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 609 (“The institutional argument is 
that emergencies work like a ratchet: With every emergency, constitutional 
protections are reduced, and after the emergency is over, enhancement of 
constitutional powers is either maintained or not fully eliminated, so that the 
executive ends up with more power after the emergency than it had before the 
emergency.  With each successive emergency, the executive’s power is ratcheted 
up.”); see also id. at 610. 
 53  SCOTT M. MATHESON, JR., PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PERILOUS 
TIMES 14 (2009). 
 54 Kim Lane Scheppele, Small Emergencies, 40 GA. L. REV. 835, 840 (2006). 
 55  Id. at 835 (defining “small emergencies” as “problems that are deemed 
worthy of exceptional solutions, but are simultaneously deemed too minor to 
warrant a full-fledged reassessment of constitutional structures and constitutional 
aspirations”).  
 56 Id. at 836 (“America is now—and has been since the First World War—
virtually always in a state of emergency, one way or another.”). 
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expanded power is then “absorbed and rationalized” by an implied 
emergency power system.57 
In contrast to Professor Scheppele, Professors Eric Posner and 
Adrian Vermeule have argued that the notion of the executive 
power ratchet is simply not true because “institutional change 
displays no consistent trend or mechanism and is determined 
differently in different contexts by a complex mix of political, 
economic, and technological forces.”58  In rejecting the idea of an 
executive powers “ratchet,” Vermeule and Posner find individual 
expansions of executive power to be less problematic.  Rather than 
a one-way ratcheting up of executive power, they describe 
emergency executive action as having a spillover effect. 59   This 
spillover effect may change the balance of power between the 
executive and the other branches, but it may be cleaned up if the 
other branches resist this acquisition of executive power.60 
Alternatively, Posner and Vermeule posit that even if the 
spillover effect turns into a more or less permanent increase in 
executive power, that increase would be “in itself, neither good nor 
bad.”61  Rather, they assert that “[t]he only question is whether the 
new state of affairs is an improvement on the status quo ante or not; 
if it is an improvement, then the spillover was a benign event.”62  
This “no harm no foul” approach to shifts in the balance of 
governmental power, however, ignores a serious potential for 
abuse.  It does not take into account the fact that, while the “new 
state of affairs” created by a spillover may appropriately reconfigure 
the security-liberty balance, this rebalancing often occurs in an 
informal way that may not be recognizable at the time.  This 
informal barrier may be exploited in the future if an executive who 
is willing to break through informal barriers gains control of these 
increases in executive discretion. 
In addition to the question of whether increases in executive 
power “ratchet” up in an inexorable expansion, another key 
question regarding emergency power is whether it is or should be 
legal.  Professor Benjamin Kleinerman argues that we should 
 
 57 Id. at 837. 
 58 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 619. 
 59 Id. at 622. 
 60 Id. at 619. 
 61 Id. at 622. 
 62 Id. 
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distinguish between a “legal order” and a “constitutional order.”63  
In other words, though an action may in fact be extralegal, that does 
not necessarily mean that the action is unconstitutional.  Professor 
Kleinerman’s theory arises from the dangers he sees in requiring 
that every action taken by a constitutional government must be 
sanctioned by law. 64   This focus on the legality of the action, 
according to Professor Kleinerman, requires that a constitutional 
government must be given the authority to adjust its own laws when 
faced with an emergency to which the current legal structure cannot 
respond.65  This will result in a constitutional paradox of sorts:  “The 
difficulty is that, precisely by creating the legal authority to exercise 
extraordinary powers, one runs the risk that they will become both 
routinized and institutionalized.”66  Rather, Professor Kleinerman 
would read into a constitution the inherent ability to respond to 
crises regardless of the “legality” of the means exercised. 
The difficulty with Professor Kleinerman’s model is that he 
undervalues the role that executive precedent plays in the expansion 
of executive power.  Kleinerman writes:  “I would say that the 
temporary, extralegal, nonprecedential, and explicitly impeachable 
quality of executive discretion prevents it from creating [a] 
dangerous principle . . . while the legal, precedential, and 
representative character of legislative action does create such a 
principle.”67  Experience, however, would indicate that executive 
precedent actually plays a significant role in defining the limits of 
presidential authority.  This role of executive precedent will be 
examined below, particularly in the contexts of Weimar Germany 
and the U.S. system.68 
Professor Scheppele provides a different approach to this 
position as well and argues that it is this exact lack of a “toggle” 
between emergency and non-emergency action that has led to what 
she describes as a continuous expansion of executive power.  She 
describes the problem as follows: 
America has not in general had a toggle-switch approach to 
crises, where normal constitutionalism continues until a 
switch is flipped to stop it, and then the emergency continues 
 
 63 Kleinerman, supra note 28, at 92-93. 
 64 Id. at 92. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 102-03. 
 68 See infra Parts III, VI. 
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until the switch is flipped back.  Instead, the United States 
has tended to normalize its emergencies.  As a result, normal 
governance is at least in part always emergency governance, 
even when a crisis is not looming.69 
In essence, Professor Scheppele argues that by trying to legitimize 
emergency powers as a proper exercise of constitutional authority, 
there is no mechanism in place to “take back” the expanded powers 
exercised by the executive during an emergency.  Rather, the 
government should acknowledge the extra-constitutional nature of 
its actions.  This position will remind readers of the “liberalist” camp 
outlined above.  Once again, a definitive answer to these questions 
is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is important for the reader 
to keep these questions in mind when evaluating the strengths and 
weaknesses of the emergency power regimes discussed in the 
following Parts. 
III. EMERGENCY POWERS IN WEIMAR GERMANY 
The Weimar Republic is the prime example of the dangers of 
constitutional emergency powers and is a favorite punching bag of 
those who argue that a constitution that allows for emergency 
powers outside the traditional constitutional process is a 
constitution which invites its own usurpation.  Indeed, the fact that 
the collapse of the Weimar Republic allowed Hitler and the Nazi 
Party to seize control of the German government seems to provide 
all the evidence necessary to show that emergency powers are too 
dangerous to be allowed.  The Weimar Republic has also served as 
a cautionary tale for advocates of constitutional emergency powers, 
a bright warning sign showing the necessity of providing proper 
checks and restrictions on an otherwise desirable tool of 
constitutional governance.70  Neither opponents nor proponents of 
emergency powers can avoid discussing the stark example of the 
Weimar Republic and the role that emergency powers played in the 
collapse of the fragile interbellum constitutional structure.  
The Weimar Constitution was drafted by members of the 
National Constituent Assembly.  The National Constituent 
 
 69 Scheppele, supra note 54, at 839. 
 70  See, e.g., FREDERICK MUNDELL WATKINS, THE FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
EMERGENCY POWERS UNDER THE GERMAN REPUBLIC 16 (1939). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss2/1
2020] Executives in Crisis 359 
Assembly was elected on January 19, 191971 and promulgated the 
Constitution on August 14, 1919. 72   A full discussion of this 
constitutional drafting process is well beyond the scope of this 
Article, but there are a few important concepts to note.  First, it 
seems clear that the Weimar Constitution was, from the outset, a 
compromised document.  The left wing Social Democratic Party 
wanted far greater protections for workers than they received; and 
right-wing aristocrats wanted to restore the monarchy and resented 
the idea of constitutional government at all.73   
To assuage the fear of “parliamentary absolutism” held by those 
on the right, a Reich President was created by the Constitution and 
endowed with “extensive powers”74 including the ability to declare 
a state of Emergency “[i]f the public safety and order” were 
“seriously disturbed or endangered.”75  The powers granted by a 
state of emergency were outlined in Article 48 of the Weimar 
Constitution, 76  and allowed the President to take the measures 
 
 71 See DETLEV J. K. PEUKERT, THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC: THE CRISIS OF CLASSICAL 
MODERNITY 4 (Richard Deveson trans., 1989). 
 72 Id. 
 73 EBERHARD KOLB, THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC 19 (P.S. Falla & R. J. Park trans., 2d 
ed. 2005). 
 74 Id. 
 75  ROSSITER, supra note 29, at 31 (translating Article 48 of the Weimar 
Constitution). 
 76 The full text of Article 48, as translated by Clinton Rossiter in his book 
Constitutional Dictatorship, reads,  
If a state does not fulfill the duties incumbent upon it under the 
national Constitution or laws, the President of the Reich may compel it to 
do so with the aid of the armed forces.   
If the public safety and order in the German Reich are seriously 
disturbed or endangered, the President of the Reich may take the 
measures necessary to the restoration of the public safety and order, and 
may intervene with the armed forces.  To this end he may temporarily 
suspend in whole or in part the fundamental rights established in Articles 
114 (inviolability of person), 115 (inviolability of domicile), 117 (secrecy of 
communication), 118 (freedom of opinion and expression thereof), 123 
(freedom of assembly), 124 (freedom of association), and 153 (inviolability 
of property).   
The President of the Reich must immediately inform the Reichstag of 
all measures taken in conformity with section 1 or 2 of this Article.  
The measures are to be revoked upon the demand of the Reichstag.   
In cases where delay would be dangerous, the state government may 
take for its territory temporary measures of the nature described in section 
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“necessary to the restoration of the public safety and order.”77  This 
included the ability to suspend certain constitutional protections 
such as freedom of the press, freedom of association, and 
inviolability of persons and property, as well as the power to use the 
armed forces “if necessary” to restore order and to create special 
military courts.78 
The checks which the Weimar constitution placed on the use of 
emergency powers proved to be startlingly inadequate.  First, the 
language of Article 48 was vague and failed to provide much in the 
way of guidance in determining when a state of emergency existed 
and what powers the government could exercise during an 
emergency.  For example, Article 48 authorized emergency action 
whenever “public safety and order in the German Reich is materially 
disturbed or endangered.”79  What constituted a material disturbance 
was not defined anywhere else in the document.  Additionally, 
 
2.  The measures are to be revoked upon the demand of the President of 
the Reich or the Reichstag.  
A national law shall prescribe the details.   
ROSSITER, supra note 29, at 31 (translating Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution).  
Another helpful translation is reprinted in Frederick M. Watkins’ The Failure of 
Constitutional Emergency Powers under the German Republic.  It reads,  
If any state fails to perform the duties imposed upon it by the federal 
constitution or by federal laws, the president may hold it to the 
performance thereof with the aid of the armed forces.   
If public safety and order in the German Reich is materially disturbed 
or endangered, the president may take necessary measures to restore 
public safety and order, intervening if necessary with the aid of the armed 
forces.  To this end he may temporarily suspend, in whole or in part, the 
fundamental rights established by Articles 114 [personal liberty], 115 
[inviolability of dwelling places], 117 [secrecy of postal, telegraphic and 
telephonic communications], 118 [freedom in the expression of opinion], 
123 [freedom of assembly], 124 [freedom of association] and 153 [private 
property].   
The president must immediately inform the Reichstag of all measures 
adopted by authority of the first or second paragraphs of this Article.  
These measures are to be revoked upon demand of the Reichstag.  
In cases where delay would be dangerous the cabinet of a state 
government may for its own territory take provisional measures as 
specified in paragraph 2.  These measures are to be revoked on demand of 
the president or of the Reichstag.   
Further details will be regulated by federal law. 
WATKINS, supra note 70, at 15 (translating Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution). 
 77 ROSSITER, supra note 29, at 31. 
 78 WATKINS, supra note 70, at 15, 32. 
 79 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Article 48 authorized the use of all necessary measures to restore 
order and public safety.80  As the contemporary political science 
scholar Frederick Watkins noted in 1939, this was a remarkable 
grant of power to the government with little in place to limit its 
scope.81 
Second, in addition to the use of vague language to grant 
exceptionally broad powers to the government acting in an 
emergency, Article 48 also limited the role of the Reichstag to that of 
a negative veto on emergency actions, requiring only that “[t]he 
president must immediately inform the Reichstag of all measures 
adopted by . . . this Article.  These measures are to be revoked upon 
demand of the Reichstag.”82  By removing Parliamentary assent as a 
requirement for the effective exercise of emergency authority, 
Article 48 provided an easy way for the legislature to avoid making 
difficult decisions during crisis situations.  Rather, the Reichstag 
could play a passive role allowing the executive to carry out the 
unpopular measures necessary to resolve a crisis.  While this may 
have been politically convenient for the legislature, it allowed for 
legislative abdication during an emergency, which effectively 
removed the legislature as a check on emergency action. 
Finally, Article 48 provided no specific role for the judiciary to 
serve as a check upon emergency government action.  While the 
judiciary could review specific actions taken by the government 
during a state of emergency to see if that action was within the 
powers granted by Article 48, this rarely proved to be a significant 
check upon the executive. 83   The language of Article 48 was 
remarkably vague, giving little guidance which the courts could rely 
on to interpret the outer limits of the powers granted therein.  But, 
perhaps more importantly, even though the courts could 
occasionally review a specific action taken under the Article 48 
powers, the executive was given sole discretion to decide when 
circumstances sufficiently justified a declaration of emergency. 84  
 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 But see id. at 104-05 (citing an important counterexample to this general 
judicial passivity in the supreme court’s ruling that “the appointment of state 
representatives by a federal commissioner was a wholly illegal act”). 
 84 See id. at 21 (“Since the custom of the German judiciary had always been to 
accept findings of the government in matters of fact, the courts were consistent 
throughout the lifetime of the Republic in their refusal to inquire into the actual 
necessity of any measures taken on the basis of Article 48.”). 
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Therefore, the courts played almost no role in checking the ability of 
the government to invoke the powers of Article 48, even though they 
may have limited the use of those powers at the margins. 
Historians of the Weimar period (including Professor Watkins) 
have focused on the use of emergency powers in three semi-distinct 
periods:  First, in response to coup attempts in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II; second, to deal with the deflationary 
crisis of 1922-1923 that was triggered by Germany’s inability to meet 
the harsh reparation requirements imposed by the Treaty of 
Versailles; and third, in an effort to combat the devastating effects of 
the worldwide depression which began in 1929.  Scholars are split 
on the effectiveness of Article 48 to combat crises in the early years 
of the Weimar Republic, but there is consensus that by the time 
Article 48 was used to prop up failing government after failing 
government during the Depression, emergency powers had become 
the source of constitutional collapse. 
a. Article 48 and Armed Uprisings 
The emergency powers granted by Article 48 were used almost 
immediately after the creation of the Weimar Republic.  Socialist and 
Communist uprisings were not a regular occurrence, but they were 
not all that infrequent either.85  Reactionary putsch attempts from 
disaffected right-wing members of the recently disbanded military 
were also a constant threat. 86   The Reich government was 
responsible for ensuring the continued viability of the Weimar 
Republic in the face of these anti-constitutional actions. 
One limitation on the effectiveness of the emergency powers 
granted by Article 48 was revealed by the drastically different ways 
the emergency-empowered government acted in response to both 
right- and left-wing-led civil unrest.  Because the tools provided by 
Article 48 to respond to armed insurrection primarily incorporated 
a military response, Article 48 measures were only available if the 
military could be counted on to support the federal government.87  
Because the upper echelons of the German military were largely 
populated with right-leaning supporters of the pre-war Imperial 
 
 85 See id. at 25-26 (discussing the Communist insurrection of 1920 and the peak 
influence of Marxist revolutionaries in Germany immediately following WWI). 
 86 See ROSSITER, supra note 29, at 40 
 87 See id. at 40-41. 
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government, the Reich could rarely invoke the powers of Article 48 
to confront reactionary violence.  For example, a right-wing putsch 
attempt in Berlin began on March 13, 1920.88  The government was 
unable to respond because the military presence in Berlin was 
sympathetic to the coup attempt. 89   Fortunately for the young 
republic, the putsch was not well organized, was opposed by the 
Unions in the city, and quickly collapsed even without federal 
intervention.90 
Perhaps the most (in)famous example of federal impotence in 
the face of right-wing extremism was the tepid federal response to 
Adolf Hitler’s Beer Hall putsch in Munich in 1923.  Briefly, this coup 
attempt commenced on November 8, 1923, when Adolf Hitler 
extracted at gunpoint various National Socialist concessions from 
the local government.91  The actual armed threat was put down the 
following day, but notably it was the Bavarian state government that 
effectively dealt with the crisis and not the Reich government itself.92  
German historian and political scientist Eberhard Kolb described the 
events with significant understatement noting that the Reich 
government had “acted much less energetically against right-wing 
insurgence in Bavaria in November 1923 than they had done against 
left-wing Saxony and Thuringia in the previous month.”93 
In contrast to the relative ineffectiveness of the Article 48 powers 
to confront reactionary uprisings, the Reich government made 
extensive use of its Article 48 powers to suppress Socialist uprisings 
during the early 1920s.  Unlike during the Berlin putsch attempt, for 
example, the Reich government relied extensively on its Article 48 
powers to put down a threatened Communist Insurrection in the 
early spring of 1920.94   Because the military was staunchly anti-
Communist, the question of divided loyalties, which restrained 
federal use of emergency powers during right-wing insurrections, 
posed no similar obstacle to crushing left-wing unrest.  Threatened 
strikes in January of 1920 and 1921 were quickly and harshly 
 
 88 KOLB, supra note 73, at 37-38. 
 89 Id. at 38. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 50. 
 92 Id.; WATKINS, supra note 70, at 38. 
 93 KOLB, supra note 73, at 50. 
 94 WATKINS, supra note 70, at 28-30. 
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suppressed by military forces authorized to take action under 
Article 48.95 
Then, in the Fall of 1923, the government learned that 
preparations for an armed Communist uprising in Saxony and 
Thuringia (both left-leaning German states) were well underway.96  
The Reich government took immediate and extensive emergency 
actions.  Professor Kolb described the events as follows: 
[A]s the political crisis became acute, the government had 
proclaimed a state of emergency throughout Germany, 
whereby executive power was transferred to regional 
military commanders as representatives of the Ministry of 
Defence.  When the Saxon Prime Minister, Erich Zeigner 
(SPD) [Socialist Party], refused to carry out the orders of the 
regional commander and disband the proletarian defence 
units, the central government sent Reichswehr troops into 
Saxony on 23 October and, a few days later, categorically 
ordered Zeigner to drop the communists from his Cabinet.97 
The federally appointed commissioner then instituted military 
tribunals to hear cases brought against those accused of aiding the 
insurrection and acted swiftly to censor publications that were 
sympathetic to the Communist parties.98  Once order was restored, 
the military control of these provinces was lifted.  But these 
experiences demonstrated the significant amount of control the 
government could exert over individual liberties using only the 
authority of Article 48.  This authority would soon be expanded 
even further when the Republic faced a new kind of emergency in 
1923. 
b. Article 48 and Emergency Legislation 
A significant shift in the use of Article 48 occurred during the 
deflationary crisis of 1923.  After France invaded the Ruhr Valley, 
Germany declared a massive general strike and attempted to 
subsidize its work force.99   As the strike wore on, however, and 
 
 95 KOLB, supra note 73, at 36, 45-46. 
 96 Id. at 49. 
 97 Id. 
 98 WATKINS, supra note 70, at 31-34. 
 99 Id. at 74. 
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France remained in occupied territory, the German economy 
reached the verge of collapse with inflation making its currency 
essentially worthless.100  Between December 1922 and August 1923, 
the German Mark went from an already appallingly unhealthy 8,000 
to 1 ratio against the dollar to an essentially valueless 1 million to 1 
ratio.101  In order to combat this economic crisis, significant federal 
action was needed.  The governing coalition in the Reichstag, 
however, was made up of such a wide variety of pro-constitutional 
groups that the diversity of opinion on how to handle the crisis 
made concerted action impossible.102  While Article 48 had initially 
been used primarily to deploy the federal army in response to armed 
uprisings (a traditional use of emergency powers), the Stresemann 
government claimed for the first time that Article 48 gave it the 
authority to issue emergency legislation and issued “a round dozen 
or so of decrees” to combat the economic crisis.103 
It is important to note, however, that the Cabinet did not feel 
comfortable relying solely on Article 48 for the issuance of 
emergency decrees and soon sought additional authorization from 
the Reichstag in the form of an enabling act which explicitly 
authorized such actions. 104   The enabling act specifically tied its 
longevity to the stability of the Stresemann government and when 
the Social Democrats pulled out of the Cabinet on Nov. 2, 1923 in 
 
 100 Id. 
 101 KOLB, supra note 73, at 48. 
 102 WATKINS, supra note 70, at 75. 
 103 Id. at 75. 
 104 Ermächtigungsgesetz [Enabling Act], Oct. 15, 1923, RGBL I at 943, §§ 1, 2 
(Ger.), translated in WATKINS, supra note 70, at 76.  The full text of the enabling act 
reads:  
The federal government is authorized to take those measures which 
it considers to be absolutely necessary in the financial, economic and social 
realms.  Fundamental rights guaranteed in the Weimar Constitution may 
be disregarded in the process.   
This authorization does not extend to regulations affecting hours of 
labor, nor to the reduction of pensions, social insurance or unemployment 
insurance.   
Decrees issued on this basis shall be reported without delay to the 
Reichstag and to the Reichsrat.  On demand of the Reichstag they are to be 
revoked immediately.   
This law goes into effect on the day of promulgation.  It shall cease to 
operate at the very latest on March 31, 1924, and shall lapse even before 
that time with any change in the party composition of the present 
government. 
Id. 
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response to federal treatment of the rebellions in Bavaria, Saxony, 
and Thuringia, the enabling act came to an end.105  When a new 
government was formed under Chancellor Marx, however, a new 
enabling act was passed authorizing similar emergency powers.106  
As Professor Watkins notes, many of the emergency decrees 
undertaken during this period were not only necessary due to the 
ever-increasing splintering in the Reichstag but also effective at 
combating the economic crisis gripping Germany, writing that 
“[t]he events of the inflation period may well be taken . . . as a typical 
illustration of the benefits to be derived from emergency 
legislation.”107  The precedent set by these enabling acts, however, 
and the expansion of emergency powers in the hands of the 
executive Cabinet laid the groundwork for the opponents of the 
Weimar Republic to destroy the constitutional order from within. 
c. Article 48 and the Fall of the Weimar Republic 
After the emergency response to the deflationary crisis of 1923 
proved to be successful, the period between 1924-1929 was relatively 
 
 105 WATKINS, supra note 70, at 79. 
 106 Ermächtigungsgesetz [Enabling Act], Oct. 15, 1923, RGBL I at 1167, § 1 
(Ger.), translated in WATKINS, supra note 70, at 80. The full text of the Marx enabling 
reads: 
The federal government is authorized to take those measures which 
it considers to be absolutely necessary in view of the distressing 
circumstances of the people and of the Reich.  Fundamental rights 
guaranteed in the Weimar Constitution may not be disregarded.  Before 
being issued, all ordinances are to be discussed in secret session with 
committees chosen by the Reichstag and by the Reichsrat, each to consist 
of 15 members.   
Decrees issued on this basis shall be reported without delay to the 
Reichstag and to the Reichsrat.  They are to be revoked on demand of the 
Reichstag or of the Reichsrat. In the Reichstag two readings separated by 
an interval of at least three days shall be necessary for the completion of 
such a demand.   
The Reichstag committee mentioned in paragraph I shall also be 
authorized, at the discretion of the Reichstag, to consider proposals 
relative to ordinances issued under the law of October 13, 1923 [the 
Stresemann enabling act].   
This law goes into effect on the day of promulgation. It shall cease to 
operate on February 15, 1924. 
Id. 
 107 WATKINS, supra note 70, at 85. 
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stable.108  But, as world-wide depression hit at the end of the 1920s, 
the deepening dysfunction of the Weimar Reichstag led to the worst 
instance of emergency power abuse in the history of a constitutional 
republic. 
After several unsuccessful governments in 1926 and 1927, the 
election of May 1928 saw significant decreases in the number and 
percentage of Reichstag seats held by center and center-right parties, 
coupled with significant increases for the Socialist and Communist 
Parties and the rise of splinter groups which supported narrow 
interests.109  The increasingly fractured Reichstag became less and 
less capable of forming a governing coalition.110  With the onset of 
the worldwide depression in 1929, Germany once again found itself 
in the midst of an economic crisis.  As with the deflationary crisis, 
emergency powers both under Article 48 and authorized by 
delegation acts provided the basis for German government.  As the 
Reichstag continued to splinter, however, the inability to form an 
effective governing coalition meant that there was no opposition to 
the extent of power exercised by the executive.  Emergency decrees 
became the normal mode of governance as legislation continued to 
decrease and the Reichstag sat for fewer days each year between 
1930 and 1932.111 
Then, in the Reichstag election on July 31, 1932, the Nazi and 
Communist Parties gained enough seats (230 and 89, respectively, 
out of a total of 608) to block any other parties from forming a 
governing coalition. 112  This Reichstag was dissolved after a vote of 
no confidence in the Papen government and a new election was held 
on November 6, 1932.  But, once again, no governing coalition could 
be formed. 113   This effectively put an end to the ability of the 
legislature to function under the Weimar Constitution.  Without a 
functioning legislature, the only working office in the government 
was that of the Presidency, held by former general Paul von 
Hindenburg, who favored a return to a more imperial style of 
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government.114  With the dissolution of each successively elected 
Reichstag before a vote of no-confidence could be called, each new 
Chancellor after 1930 required the support of President 
Hindenburg.115  Each Cabinet then governed exclusively through 
emergency decrees authorized by Article 48.  In an attempt to create 
a governing right-wing coalition, which would need support from 
the Nazi Party to achieve a governing majority, President 
Hindenburg and his advisers turned to Adolf Hitler and supported 
his bid for chancellor.116  Once installed as a presidentially approved 
Chancellor, Hitler relied on the precedent set by the Stresemann and 
Marx Cabinets during the deflationary crisis and augmented his 
Article 48 authority through the completely legal means of a new 
enabling act.117  Though the means employed did not violate the 
Weimar Constitution itself, the content of the act clearly brought an 
end to the Weimar Republic: 
National laws may be enacted by the national cabinet as 
well as in accordance with the procedure established in the 
Constitution.  This applies to the laws referred to in Article 
85, paragraph 2 and in Article 87.  [These articles provide for 
parliamentary control of the budget.] 
The national laws enacted by the national cabinet may 
deviate from the Constitution in so far as they do not affect 
the position of the Reichstag and of the Reichsrat.  The 
powers of the president remain unchanged. 
The national laws enacted by the national cabinet are to 
be prepared by the chancellor and published in the 
Reichsgesetzblatt.  They come into effect, unless otherwise 
stipulated, upon the day following publication.  Articles 68 
to 77 of the Constitution do not apply to laws enacted by the 
national cabinet.  [These articles were the ones governing 
procedure in the enactment of national legislation.] 
Treaties of the Reich with foreign states which concern 
matters of national legislation do not require the consent of 
the bodies participating in legislation.  The national cabinet 
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is empowered to issue all provisions necessary for the 
execution of such treaties. 
This law becomes effective on the day of publication.  It 
becomes invalid on April 1, 1937; it also becomes invalid 
when the present national cabinet is replaced by another.118 
As Professor Watkins notes, the lack of restrictions placed upon 
the Article 48 powers, allowed the constitution itself to be used to 
bring about the downfall of the Weimar Republic.  He writes: 
From a purely external standpoint, however, there was 
never any need to depart from the norms of absolute legality.  
Since the courts refused at all times to pass on the need for 
emergency measures, the ultimate right of decision 
remained for the time being in the hands of the executive.  
Executive power in turn was vested in a National Socialist 
chancellor.  Under these circumstances there was nothing to 
prevent Article 48 from becoming an effective legal agency 
for the destruction of the Republic.119 
This exploitation of an explicit system of emergency powers to 
destroy the very foundations of constitutional government remains 
the strongest historical cautionary tale against the employment of 
explicit emergency powers.  The subsequent examples of de Gaulle 
in France and Indira Gandhi in India, to which this Article next 
turns, provide less extreme historical incidents which are worthy of 
investigation to see if they offer us any common threads from which 
we can begin to draw a few modest conclusions. 
IV. EMERGENCY POWERS IN FRANCE’S FIFTH REPUBLIC 
Article 16 of the 1958 French Constitution grants the President of 
the Republic the ability to invoke a state of emergency upon 
consultation with specified members of Parliament and the 
Constitutional Council.120  Such an invocation grants the President 
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broad powers to address whatever “crisis” is at hand, including 
power to unilaterally promulgate laws. 121   The story of both 
executive and emergency powers under the Fifth Republic is largely 
the story of Charles de Gaulle. 122   Until the 2016 Paris terrorist 
attacks, Charles de Gaulle was the only French President to have 
invoked an Article 16 Emergency, and his 1962 referendum 
drastically strengthened the position of the president.  Therefore, 
this Part will sketch out the actions of the Gaullist government from 
the formation of the Constitution through the 1961 Emergency and 
up to the 1962 referendum which established direct election of the 
President.  These events had an outsized impact on the role of the 
French executive and should provide sufficient context to analyze 
how the use of emergency powers works under the 1958 
Constitution. 
The 1958 Constitution emerged from the inability of the Fourth 
Republic to deal with a crisis in Algeria and the inclusion of 
executive emergency powers likely stems from these troubled 
origins.  On May 13, 1958, French Army officers led by General 
Jacques Massu formed a “Government of Public Safety” which 
named Massu President of Algeria.123  Eleven days later, Algerian 
forces invaded Corsica and plans for an invasion of the French 
mainland were in place.124 
The government structure under the Fourth Republic seemed 
incapable of responding to the crisis.  Largely, this incapacity was 
due to the response to the Vichy regime and to some extent the “de 
facto dictatorship”125  of the provisional government put in place 
 
interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take the measures commanded by 
these circumstances, after official consultation with the Premier, the Presidents of 
the assemblies and the Constitutional Council.  He shall inform the nation of these 
measures in a message.  These measures must be prompted by the desire to ensure 
to the constitutional governmental authorities, in the shortest possible time, the 
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consulted with regard to such measures.  Parliament shall meet by right.  The 
National Assembly may not be dissolved during the exercise of emergency powers 
by the President.”). 
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a momentum which it was easier to adapt to than to turn.”). 
 123 JULIAN JACKSON, CHARLES DE GAULLE 72-73 (2003). 
 124 Id. at 74. 
 125 Id. at 42. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss2/1
2020] Executives in Crisis 371 
after the liberation of Paris. 126  In the aftermath of World War II the 
drafters of the Fourth Republic placed severe limitations on 
executive power and created a system of parliamentary 
supremacy.127  Due to deep divisions within French political parties, 
however, a stable government never developed.  During the twelve 
years of the Fourth Republic, from 1946-1958, there were twenty-one 
different governments.128  In this way the Fourth Republic appeared 
to be repeating the cycle of powerless Parliaments which had 
plagued and ultimately destroyed the Weimar Republic.129 
While the government remained in a state of near paralysis in 
the face of the Algerian putsch, Charles de Gaulle announced that he 
would be willing to return to political life to confront the crisis.130  In 
response to public outcry to bring de Gaulle back, the existing 
government resigned, allowing for the appointment of de Gaulle.131  
But de Gaulle conditioned his return to public life on the drafting of 
a new constitution, one based on the vision he had elaborated twelve 
years before, but which had been rejected by drafters of the 
constitution of the Fourth Republic.132 
De Gaulle initially laid out his ideas for the post-war constitution 
in a now-famous speech at Bayeux on June 16, 1946. 133   He 
envisioned an executive completely independent of parliamentary 
control, who acted in the defense of the nation as a whole and rose 
above the political in-fighting of the parliamentary system.  He 
urged that “over and above political contingencies, there be 
established a national arbiter to assure continuity amidst shifting 
political arrangements.”134  De Gaulle warned of the dangers of a 
divided government without a strong central leader saying:  “the 
internal unity, cohesion, and discipline of the Government of France 
must be sacrosanct, or else we will soon see the very management 
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of the country powerless and discredited.” 135   The recent and 
traumatic disasters of strong executive governments prior to World 
War II, however, influenced the drafters of the 1946 constitution far 
more than de Gaulle’s words, and they largely disregarded de 
Gaulle’s warnings.  But de Gaulle’s fears appeared nearly prophetic 
when the events in Algeria proved beyond the capacity of the Fourth 
Republic. 
Considering the circumstances bringing de Gaulle back into 
national political life, it is perhaps unsurprising that the new 
Constitution created in 1958 would more closely follow de Gaulle’s 
earlier vision than did the 1946 constitution.136  This still did not go 
far enough for de Gaulle.  As his Bayeux speech clearly showed, de 
Gaulle envisioned a powerful, independent president.137  On its face, 
however, the constitution of the Fifth Republic, did not necessarily 
create a “President-centered” system.  For example, the President 
was elected indirectly, instead of through direct universal 
suffrage.138  Additionally, while the President appointed the Prime 
Minister, the Prime Minister’s government was still responsible to 
Parliament, and the constitution split the executive power between 
the Prime Minister and the President, creating a dual executive.139 
Article 16 of the 1958 Constitution, however, did grant the 
President the ability to declare a state of emergency to respond to 
periods of national crisis. It should be noted that De Gaulle’s 
political style grated on multiple important constituencies. 140  
Perhaps in recognition of this, de Gaulle encouraged his surrogates 
to downplay the risks such a powerful provision posed.  Michel 
Debré, for example, who drafted most of the 1958 Constitution, 
pointed to the retention of parliamentary supremacy in the new 
constitution and the requirement that the parliament would have to 
approve any invocation of Article 16.141  In large part due to the 
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continued threat of an Algerian Civil War, the 1958 Constitution was 
accepted with Article 16 intact and took effect on October 4, 1958.142 
While the beginning of the Algerian rebellion had brought de 
Gaulle back into national leadership and led to the creation of the 
1958 Constitution, over the next three years the Algerian situation 
continued to plague the Gaullist government and eventually led to 
de Gaulle’s invocation of a state of emergency under Article 16.  On 
April 22, 1961, military leaders in Algeria attempted another coup.143  
De Gaulle sought and received approval from the Prime Minister, 
the Presidents of the legislative chambers and the Constitutional 
Council to declare a state of emergency.144  He then immediately 
went on national radio and appealed to the loyalty of the Army.145  
The coup failed almost instantly and the danger had passed by April 
25th, yet de Gaulle maintained a state of emergency for six more 
months.146  
During the Emergency, de Gaulle used his Article 16 authority 
to pass several directives, which likely could not have made it 
through a divided legislature.  Additionally, while de Gaulle 
followed the letter of Article 16, which explicitly prohibits 
dissolution of the legislature during an Emergency, he prohibited 
the sitting assembly from debating any measures related to the 
Emergency. 147  By removing any potential check on his power from 
the legislature, de Gaulle had essentially given himself free reign to 
govern as he saw fit, because prior to the Freedom of Association Case, 
the Constitutional Council rarely exercised judicial review.148  This 
meant that, in reality, the Gaullist government operated with almost 
complete dictatorial power between April 23 and September 29, 
1961.149 
While de Gaulle’s use of Article 16 caused many to fear increases 
in executive power, a later action using a different portion of the 
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1958 Constitution made perhaps the greatest alteration to the 
government structure of the Fifth Republic.  As discussed above, de 
Gaulle firmly believed that the President of the Republic should bear 
responsibility for the security of the nation.  But the 1958 
Constitution had granted the Parliamentary government a nominal 
supremacy. 150   In spite of this, de Gaulle believed that a 
democratically “legitimate” President could gain the upper hand.  
However, as discussed above, Article 6 established an indirect 
election for the President.151  To change this election procedure, de 
Gaulle would need to change the constitution. 
Article 89 specified the procedure for amending the constitution 
and under the requirements of the amendment process, in order to 
implement direct national election of the president, de Gaulle would 
need parliamentary approval. 152   Leftists in the legislature still 
feared a Gaullist dictatorship and could prevent the passage of the 
desired amendment. 153   Instead of following this prescribed 
amendment process, de Gaulle appealed directly to the French 
electorate and called for a national referendum on direct Presidential 
election.154 
Article 11 of the 1958 Constitution allowed for direct referenda 
to change the “organization of the public authorities,”155  and de 
Gaulle claimed that changing the electoral structure to allow direct 
universal suffrage for the President fell into this Article 11 
category.156  Legal scholars and commentators almost universally 
condemned de Gaulle’s referendum as it would alter the 
constitutionally prescribed method for selecting the president and 
therefore could only be accomplished through an Article 89 
constitutional amendment. 157   Despite these legal objections, de 
Gaulle’s referendum was approved by sixty-two percent of voters.158 
The transition to direct national election of the president has had 
a much longer lasting effect on constitutional allocation of powers 
than the 1961 Emergency period.  While this perhaps shows that 
emergency powers are less effective at accumulating executive 
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power over the long term, the severe impact on civil liberties 
demonstrated during the six-month de Gaulle Emergency shows 
that emergency powers lend themselves to executive abuse.  This 
theme will emerge even more clearly in the following analysis of 
emergency powers in India. 
V. EMERGENCY POWERS IN INDIRA GANDHI’S INDIA 
As with de Gaulle in France, the Indian story of emergency 
power largely revolves around a single individual:  Indira Gandhi.  
Gandhi’s use of emergency powers to quell political opposition and 
maintain her hold on national leadership traumatized the country 
and led to significant reforms in the Indian concept of emergency 
powers.  This Part will focus primarily on the events leading up to 
and during the so-called “Internal Emergency” of 1975-1977. 
Under the initially adopted Indian Constitution, the president of 
India could declare a state of Emergency under Article 352 in cases 
where “the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists 
whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof 
is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal 
disturbance.” 159   A declaration of Emergency suspended 
prohibitions on federal actions within the states;160 imposed a duty 
on the federal government to protect the states from “external 
aggression and internal disturbance”;161 suspended the protections 
for fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 of the 
Constitution;162 and allowed the President to close the courts to any 
challenges against emergency actions brought under any of the 
fundamental rights guarantees in Part III of the constitution.163  This 
Part describes how, as a direct result of the Internal Emergency, the 
constitution was amended to more clearly define the situations 
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which would justify a declared Emergency and to expand the role 
of the courts in checking emergency actions.164 
a. Drafting History 
While the emergency powers described above are quite 
sweeping and remained relatively unchanged for the first thirty 
years of constitutional government in India, not all members of the 
Constituent Assembly favored including such dramatic allocations 
of authority to the government in times of crises.  In fact, during the 
drafting convention, several assembly members voiced extensive 
opposition citing the dangers posed by explicit approval of 
emergency powers.  For example, one member of the Constituent 
Assembly, H. V. Kamath, objected to the proposed emergency 
provisions in the draft constitution based on the role the abuse of 
such powers played in the fall of the Weimar Republic:   
I find no parallel to this Chapter of Emergency Provisions in 
any of the other Constitutions of democratic countries in the 
world.  The closest approximation to my mind is reached in 
the Weimar Constitution of the Third Reich which was 
destroyed by Hitler, taking advantage of the very same 
provisions contained in that Constitution . . . . 
It has been recognized by students of politics that the very 
provisions in the Weimar Constitution . . . contributed to the 
rise of Herr Hitler and paved the way to his dictatorship.  
Compared to that art 48 of the Weimar Constitution, the 
provisions we are making under Chapter XI are far more 
drastic . . . [sic] We should alter and revise this Chapter to see 
that the liberties guaranteed in this Constitution are real.165 
Another member, Professor K. T. Shah, objected to the limitations 
emergency powers would place on the proposed Supreme Court:   
The moment you introduce a provision like this in our 
Constitution, the moment you provide that the right to move 
the Supreme Court which has been guaranteed by a previous 
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article shall be suspended by an Order of the President, by 
an Order of the Executive, that moment you declare that 
your entire Constitution is of no effect.166 
These objections succeeded in defeating the initial push for an 
emergency powers provision.  The issue reappeared later in the 
drafting process, however, and was included in the final 
constitution apparently without any further difficulty.167 
b. Early Uses of Emergency Powers 
Prior to Indira Gandhi’s Emergency of 1975-1977, Article 352 had 
only been invoked in the face of external military conflicts.  In the 
Fall of 1962 in response to an “armed conflict with China,” the 
Indian government declared its first Emergency under the new 
Constitution.168  The government used its emergency authority to 
issue the “Defence of India Ordinance” and the “Defence of India 
Rules.” 169   These acts—coupled with a Presidential Order 
suspending the ability to mount certain challenges to 
unconstitutional detentions—allowed the government to detain 
individuals without any judicial process.170 
Despite the jurisdictional bar imposed by the Presidential Order, 
the Indian Supreme Court entertained a challenge by detainees 
arrested under the Defence of India Act.171  In Makhan Singh, the 
Court ruled that while Article 359 allowed the President to prohibit 
challenges to emergency actions if those challenges were based on 
specified constitutional guarantees located within Part III of the 
constitution, such a bar did not prohibit detention challenges 
brought on other grounds.172  Mr. Singh then filed a subsequent 
petition alleging bad faith prosecution (mala fides) and was granted 
release by the Supreme Court.173 
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As with the French Emergency in 1961, the danger of armed 
hostilities passed quickly, but the State of Emergency continued 
long after the threat.  The Makhan Singh cases were heard in 1963, 
but the Emergency continued and was still in place in August of 
1965 when armed hostilities erupted between India and Pakistan.174  
The government simply adapted the existing emergency to the new 
conflict and although once again the actual skirmishes receded 
within a few weeks, the Emergency remained in place until January 
1968, when sufficient public pressure had mounted to convince the 
government to end the Emergency.175 
The second Emergency declared under the 1948 Constitution 
arose from another armed conflict with Pakistan.  In December 1971, 
a civil war between West Pakistan and the eastern portion of 
Pakistan, which would become Bangladesh, spilled over the border 
into India when Pakistani planes bombarded Indian air bases.176  
Indira Gandhi (who had been elected Prime Minister in 1967),177 
engaged the Pakistani military immediately and declared an 
Emergency to deal with the crisis.178  Acting under this emergency 
authority the government passed the “Maintenance of Internal 
Security Act 1971” (MISA), which once again allowed the 
government a relatively free-hand in detaining would-be 
dissenters. 179   The government used its authority under MISA 
extensively and detained “tens of thousands of persons, including 
communist leaders, students, peasants and industrial workers.”180 
Once again, the military engagement ended quickly, as one of 
Gandhi’s many biographers put it:  “The well-oiled Indian war 
machine performed brilliantly . . . and the lightning campaign to 
free Bangladesh was over in exactly fourteen days.”181  In what had 
become a familiar pattern, however, the government continued to 
operate under a State of Emergency for years, even reaffirming the 
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Emergency by Presidential Order in November of 1974, despite the 
cessation of hostilities nearly three years earlier and the completion 
of a peace treaty between Pakistan and India (with recognition of the 
new government of Bangladesh) in July of 1972.182 
c. The Internal Emergency 
In the spring of 1974, student protests erupted in the state of 
Bihar. 183   A retired socialist leader named Jayaprakash (J. P.) 
Narayan returned to political life and organized the unrest in Bihar 
into a growing opposition movement. 184   The government, still 
under the control of Prime minister Gandhi, used its authority under 
the continued Pakistan Emergency to harshly crack down on this 
movement but protests continued to gain momentum.185  Various 
political parties in state “by-elections” began nominating joint 
candidates who shared only the trait of opposing Gandhi’s Congress 
Party (CPP).186  In election after election throughout the last half of 
1974 and the first half of 1975, the CPP suffered electoral declines, 
pointing towards a strong likelihood that the CPP would lose the 
upcoming national elections.187 
In addition to mounting political opposition, the Prime Minister 
faced rebuke in the courts as well.  On June 24, 1975, the High Court 
of Allahabad issued a judgment against Gandhi in an election 
corruption case which had been filed after her victory in the 1972 
elections.188  The judgment prohibited Gandhi from participating as 
a member of Parliament for six years, essentially preventing her 
from governing as Prime Minister.189  The court stayed the order for 
twenty days in order to allow for an orderly transition of power but 
refused a permanent injunction while the government appealed the 
case to the Supreme Court.190 
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Rather than step down, however, Gandhi declared a new 
Emergency, this time based on “internal disturbances” as allowed 
under the original wording of Article 352. 191   While previous 
emergencies had lingered long after armed hostilities with external 
threats had ceased (and, in fact, the Pakistan Emergency was 
technically still in effect), this was the first time an Emergency had 
been declared based solely on alleged internal threats.192  Gandhi’s 
government immediately began arresting opposition leaders, 
including J. P. Narayan193 and other prominent political figures.194  
Professor Divan characterizes the detentions as targeted against 
“anyone deemed ‘unfriendly’ to Gandhi and the ruling Congress 
party.”195  Additionally, the government halted the publication of 
“opposition” newspapers and imposed stringent new censorship 
requirements on the remaining media outlets, including making it a 
crime to criticize the government.196 
As it had done during the Chinese Emergency, the judiciary took 
some steps to check exercises of emergency powers, particularly in 
response to emergency detentions.  This response reached all the 
way to the State High Courts, who continued to hear and grant 
habeas relief in the initial stages of the Emergency.  Once the 
government appealed these cases to the Supreme Court, however, 
the judiciary no longer posed a barrier to most of the government’s 
emergency actions. 197 
After the Supreme Court ruled against the government’s initial 
attempts at economic nationalization, Gandhi set out to “tame” the 
judiciary.198  When Chief Justice Sikri retired the day after handing 
down this decision, Gandhi appointed A. N. Ray to replace him.199  
Prior to this, the customary practice was to appoint the next most 
senior justice to the Chief Justice position.  J. M. Shelat, the next in 
line for the job, had ruled against the government in the Kesavananda 
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Bharati case, as had the next two most senior justices.200  Gandhi 
bypassed all three of these justices and named Ray as the new Chief 
Justice.201  Although only the fourth most senior justice on the court, 
he was the most senior justice who had ruled in her favor in 
Kesavananda Bharati.202  The passed-over justices promptly resigned 
in protest, essentially allowing Gandhi to “pack” the Court with 
friendly justices.203  It was this government-friendly Court which 
passed on the legality of the Internal Emergency detentions, as well 
as other emergency power actions taken by the government, and 
which upheld most of those government actions. 
With the president firmly under the thumb of the parliamentary 
government and with the judiciary removed as an obstacle, Gandhi 
continued to use the Internal Emergency to her advantage and 
pushed through several constitutional amendments designed to 
solidify her power grab.  These amendments further restricted the 
ability of the courts by:  taking away jurisdiction to hear election 
disputes; raising over one hundred statutes to constitutionally 
protected status including MISA; restricting the ability of state High 
Courts to issue certain writs under Article 226 of the constitution 
(including writs of habeas corpus); implementing a requirement of a 
two-thirds majority of Supreme Court justices in order to declare a 
law unconstitutional; and restricting judicial review of laws aimed 
at “anti-national activities.”204  These amendments themselves were 
also declared to be unreviewable by the courts.205 
In spite of her near total control of the Indian government, 
Gandhi believed she needed to reintroduce an element of 
democratic legitimacy in order to secure her position.206  Confident 
in the belief that her crackdown on the press and the opposition 
leaders had effectively destroyed her political adversaries, she called 
a snap election in the Spring of 1977. 207   Gandhi had vastly 
underestimated the popular anger engendered by the Internal 
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Emergency and, to her apparent surprise, she and the Congress 
Party suffered a crushing electoral defeat.208 
The newly elected government immediately went to work 
reversing the constitutional amendments passed during the 
Emergency.  In less than a year it had passed the Constitution (44th 
Amendment) Act 1978, which altered the procedures for declaring 
emergencies and restricted the powers granted during an 
emergency.209   For example, the ability to declare an Article 352 
emergency for an “internal disturbance” was replaced with a more 
limited ability in response to an “armed rebellion.”  Additionally, 
the Amendment required that an emergency declaration be 
approved by a majority in Parliament and two-thirds of the voting 
members present in order to remain effective.  To extend an 
emergency, it would need to be reaffirmed by Parliament every six 
months.  And, in response to the attacks on the judiciary, the 
Amendment prohibited stripping jurisdiction from the Courts to 
hear challenges to detentions of more than two months or challenges 
to emergency action which were claimed to violate Articles 21 and 
22 of the constitution, which protect the “fundamental rights” to life, 
liberty, and protection against arbitrary arrest, respectively.210 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Internal 
Emergency of 1975-1977 came close to destroying constitutional 
democracy in India.  The constitutional reforms which resulted from 
the experience, however, have greatly restrained the temptation to 
invoke formal states of emergency.  Subsequent emergencies have 
been called only in response to direct military threat, such as armed 
hostilities in Kashmir.211 
VI. EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
Unlike the Weimar, French, and Indian constitutions, the U.S. 
Constitution has no explicit “emergency powers” clause.  Instead, it 
contains a Vesting Clause which grants the President the noticeably 
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undefined “executive power,” 212  along with the authority of the 
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States.” 213   Additionally, the U.S. Constitution anticipates the 
potential for military conflicts and allows Congress the authority to 
call up the state militias to “suppress Insurrections and repel 
Invasions.”214  One further important distinction between the U.S. 
Constitution and those discussed above is that, instead of allowing 
for the suspension of fundamental rights during a declared state of 
emergency, the Constitution allows only the writ of habeas corpus 
to be suspended and seems (at least arguably based on the 
placement of the Suspension Clause in Article I) to confine such 
suspensions to the legislature in a few narrowly delineated 
circumstances.215 
As the drafting history of Article II and the executive powers has 
been thoroughly described elsewhere, this Part will refrain from that 
well-trodden (though endlessly fascinating) ground and will instead 
provide a short glimpse at executive responses to three of our 
nation’s most dire national crises.  Abraham Lincoln, Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt, and George W. Bush each faced national threats 
which could potentially have destroyed the country.  All three 
reacted by making expansive uses of executive power, basing their 
authority to take such actions in the vague wording of Article II.  
While examinations of the constitutionality of these actions has 
filled volumes of scholarly works, this Part will avoid such questions 
(though they will surface to some extent in Part VII) and instead will 
use the experiences of these three Presidents to show that, even 
absent an emergency powers clause, a constitution which provides 
for a sufficiently strong executive can survive times of national 
crisis. 
This brief historical account is not meant to imply that these were 
the only U.S. Presidents to make use of expansive executive powers 
during national emergencies.  The actions of George Washington in 
the face of the Whiskey Rebellion,216 Thomas Jefferson’s decision to 
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unilaterally authorize the Louisiana Purchase,217 Andrew Jackson’s 
battle with the National Bank, 218  Woodrow Wilson’s efforts to 
promote extensive censorship during World War I,219 and many of 
the measures used during the Cold War and by modern presidents 
provide numerous opportunities to examine emergency executive 
action.  The time and space constraints of this Article, however, 
make it prudent to focus on the extreme examples of Lincoln during 
the Civil War, FDR during the Great Depression, and George W. 
Bush in prosecuting the War on Terror.  The real threat to the 
continued viability of the country faced by these presidents 
demonstrates most clearly that the United States’ model has allowed 
the executive to respond to national emergencies despite lacking an 
emergency powers provision.  Whether this implied structure 
presents a greater threat to individual liberties than the explicit 
structures discussed above will be examined in Part VII. 
a. Abraham Lincoln 
Perhaps the most well-known use of United States executive 
powers to combat a national emergency were the actions taken by 
Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War.  Historians almost 
universally credit Lincoln with saving the Union, and such claims 
merit consideration in large part because of the extraordinary 
measures Lincoln took throughout the War, measures which 
seemed to disregard practice and precedent as well as traditional 
understanding of the limits on executive powers.  Just over a month 
after his inauguration, Lincoln authorized the military to suspend 
the writ of habeas corpus;220  he authorized military detention of 
civilians;221 he openly defied an order from a U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice;222 and he unilaterally ended slavery in the states still “in 
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rebellion” against the Union. 223   While Congress subsequently 
provided retroactive approval for many of these actions, Lincoln 
initially undertook such measures on his own under the umbrella of 
his executive power as commander-in-chief.  Yet despite this 
extensive use of executive power, the mechanisms of our 
constitutional republic continued to function to some extent.  For 
example, elections were never suspended even as Lincoln faced 
potential defeat in the election of 1864.  This is a common theme in 
the use of emergency powers under the U.S. Constitution.  Not once 
have presidential elections been suspended even in the face of a 
national emergency.  
This Article will not attempt a detailed analysis of the litany of 
Lincoln’s war-time maneuvers; however, a brief survey will help 
provide context for the way in which the U.S. constitutional model 
allows for extraordinary responses to extraordinary situations in the 
absence of an explicit emergency provision. 
i. Habeas Corpus 
On April 27, 1861, Lincoln authorized General Winfield Scott to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and detain individuals suspected 
of “resisting” the Union government near vital Maryland rail lines 
necessary to supply the Capitol with troops and supplies.224  One 
such detainee challenged his detention in the famous case of Ex parte 
Merryman.225  Chief Justice Taney, riding circuit, heard Merryman’s 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered General George 
Cadwalader (who was in charge of the garrison where Merryman 
was being held) to produce Merryman before the court. 226   The 
General refused to produce Merryman, and Taney issued an opinion 
from the bench declaring that the President did not have the 
authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and that the military 
could not arrest civilians.227  Taney recognized that little could be 
done to enforce his order as any attempt by civil law enforcement to 
bring the disobedient general into court would be met with the 
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armed resistance of the U.S. military.228  Nevertheless, Taney sent his 
opinion to President Lincoln, who promptly ignored the ruling and 
defended his suspension of the writ in a message to Congress given 
July 4th of that year.229 
Scholars have long debated whether Lincoln had the 
constitutional authority to suspend the writ without Congressional 
approval.  This question will be discussed in more detail in Part VII. 
For now, it is sufficient to note that even in the absence of an express 
emergency powers provision, and regardless of the legality or 
illegality of Lincoln’s action, the writ remained suspended despite 
resistance from the Court.  Congress eventually retroactively 
sanctioned Lincoln’s actions by “officially” suspending the writ for 
the duration of the war. 
ii. The Emancipation Proclamation 
Lincoln continued to take strong executive action throughout the 
course of the Civil War and always justified such actions in the 
context of the crisis threatening to rip the nation apart.  A second 
dramatic instance demonstrating this approach was the issuance of 
the Emancipation Proclamation.  Lincoln issued the preliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation in September of 1862 after the costly 
Union victory at the Battle of Antietam.230  The Proclamation went 
into effect on January 1, 1863 and declared free all slaves held in 
bondage in any of the states then still “in rebellion” against the 
Union.231  Congress played no part in the Proclamation, and Lincoln 
rooted his authority to issue it in his powers as commander-in-
chief.232  Critics of the Proclamation declared it a federal taking of 
personal property in violation of the due process clause. 
As jarring as it is to discuss the emergence from bondage of 
millions of enslaved souls as a “taking of property,” the prevailing 
understanding at the time supported the critics’ claims.  Even 
Lincoln, the “Great Emancipator,” treated the Proclamation as a 
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deprivation of property.233  But because the laws of war allowed for 
confiscation of enemy property, he felt justified in issuing the 
Proclamation under his executive powers.  Scholars can (and do) 
debate whether the laws of war actually applied.  Lincoln’s refusal 
to acknowledge the Confederacy as a sovereign nation and his 
constant references to the “Rebellion,” instead of a state of Civil War, 
are offered as evidence that no official state of war existed. 234  
Whether Lincoln should have justified the Proclamation as a 
“necessary” measure for suppressing an internal rebellion, however, 
is irrelevant to the central inquiry of this Article, because in either 
situation Lincoln would have been exercising implied emergency 
powers.  What is relevant for our purposes is the vast expansion of 
executive authority claimed with the stroke of Lincoln’s pen.  
Congress had struggled with the issue of slavery for decades prior 
to the Civil War, with little to show for it.  Lincoln’s Proclamation 
had put a virtual end to legal slavery (though it did not technically 
apply to the Border States) by sheer force of executive will.  Once 
again, Lincoln’s actions were subsequently given tacit approval with 
the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.235 
b. Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
The presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt presents an 
interesting look at emergency powers under the U.S. Constitution 
because of the unique series of crises which occurred during his 
administration.  Not only was FDR the first U.S. President to make 
extensive use of implied emergency powers to confront a domestic 
emergency outside the more traditional context of war, rebellion, or 
invasion, but he also faced the extreme military crises presented by 
the lead-up to and actual outbreak of World War II.  During this 
period, FDR used his Commander-in-Chief powers to a greater 
extent than any previous President with the possible exception of 
Lincoln. 
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i. The New Deal and Domestic Use of Emergency Power 
Perhaps the greatest expansion of executive power in U.S. 
history occurred, not during a time of war or “rebellion,” but rather 
amid the worst financial crisis the country (and the world) had ever 
seen.  FDR’s New Deal programs arguably had little effect on 
stemming the tide of the Depression, and many scholars contend 
that it was only the munitions manufacturing boom caused by 
World War II which reengaged the U.S. economy.  Regardless of 
their efficacy, however, the New Deal represented an indefatigable 
attempt to reverse the country’s financial collapse and along the way 
grew the powers of the executive branch beyond anything even 
Alexander Hamilton would have dared imagine.  Additionally, FDR 
clearly viewed his actions during the New Deal as an exercise of 
emergency authority, stating in one national address that: 
[I]n the event that the Congress shall fail [to do something to 
fix the crisis] . . . and in the event that the national emergency 
is still critical, I shall not evade the clear course of duty that 
will then confront me.  I shall ask the Congress for the one 
remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad Executive 
power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the 
power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded 
by a foreign foe.236 
Telling in this statement, however, is FDR’s admission that such a 
use of executive power during a domestic crisis needed 
Congressional approval. 
Rossiter, writing shortly after the end of World War II 
recognized “five . . . crisis techniques” to combat the Great 
Depression:  “executive initiative, executive leadership of 
legislation, an abbreviated legislative process, the delegation of 
powers by stature, and an expansion of the administrative 
branch.”237  Because of this variety of tools employed during the 
emergency, the New Deal presents an exceptional model to examine 
the way in which all three branches of government must cooperate 
over the long run in order to allow for an extension of executive 
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power.  Rather than rehash the well-trod ground of President 
Roosevelt’s daunting list of executive actions during the New Deal, 
this Part will provide a brief look at the responses made by the other 
branches of government to emergency action.  As would be expected 
in the face of such a dire emergency, Congress (the branch most 
closely tied to the voters) fell right in line with FDR’s plan and the 
majority worked together with the Administration to pass a 
breathtaking number of monumental legislative programs in FDR’s 
first one hundred days.238  During this time FDR “became a prime 
minister” and was responsible to an unprecedented degree for 
setting the domestic legislative agenda.239  Because of the rapidity 
with which FDR rolled out his efforts to combat the ever-deepening 
depression, Congress had little time to re-assert control over the 
legislative process.240   But, even given more time, the pattern of 
legislative acquiescence in the face of a present emergency would 
likely have repeated itself. 
The Supreme Court, however, initially proved an 
insurmountable obstacle to many of the First New Deal programs.  
When challenges to these new agencies reached the Court in 1936-
1937, it struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act,241 the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act,242 and the actions of the newly formed 
SEC,243 to name a few examples.  This judicial resistance is in line 
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with the previously established pattern that a significant gap in time 
between executive action and a challenge to that action in another 
branch of government typically weighs against the legitimacy of that 
executive action.  As the Depression wore on, however, the Court 
began to face mounting political pressures, including of course 
FDR’s infamous court packing scheme.  And, eventually, the Court’s 
intransigence to FDR’s expansive new programs dissolved.  By the 
time the Second New Deal programs, such as the National Labor 
Relations Act, came up for review in 1937, the judiciary reversed 
course and upheld these expansions to the administrative state.244  
This is perhaps more attributable to the fact that the emergency was 
still ongoing and therefore is not necessarily a break from our 
previously established patterns. 
ii. Emergency Power in a World at War:  Japanese Internment 
In addition to the unprecedented expansion of executive power 
in domestic policy, FDR’s use of emergency powers at home during 
World War II resulted in one of the U.S. government’s greatest 
intrusions on the civil liberties of its people:  the internment of 
hundreds of thousands of Japanese Americans.  After the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, a mild form of hysteria gripped the West Coast of the 
United States leading to an ever-increasing suspicion of residents of 
Japanese descent. 245   Local politicians (particularly in California) 
began agitating for the “relocation” of Japanese immigrants and 
even citizens of Japanese descent.246  By February of 1942, FDR had 
signed off on a military plan to send over 100,000 first- and second-
generation Japanese residents on the West Coast to relocation 
centers. 247   The constitutionality of this action was challenged 
repeatedly in the courts.  In the first case, Hirabayashi v. United 
States,248 the Court essentially punted on the constitutionality of the 
detention camps themselves and held only that an accompanying 
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curfew was constitutional under the national power to “wage 
war.”249 
Subsequently however, in the much-maligned decision of 
Korematsu v. United States, 250  the Court infamously upheld the 
constitutionality of the internment camps writing:  “There was 
evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities 
considered that the need for action was great, and time was short.  
We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of 
hindsight—now say that at that time these actions were 
unjustified.” 251   Yet this is exactly the role that the courts had 
previously played when evaluating challenges to executive actions.  
It is precisely this gap in time which had allowed the courts to 
exercise a check on the executive.  Unlike previous incidents of 
judicial restriction of emergency powers, however, Korematsu came 
to the Court while the crisis of World War II was still ongoing.  While 
this does not excuse the Court’s failure to protect the civil liberties 
of hundreds of thousands of Americans, it does situate the Korematsu 
decision within a familiar pattern that demonstrates the difficulty of 
requiring only post hoc review from the other branches of 
government:  If a crisis still exists it is much more difficult to restrain 
the governmental branch that is actively attempting to resolve the 
crisis. 
Rather, in such situations it is easier for the other branches 
(particularly the courts) to place limits at the margins of emergency 
powers and then gradually continue to restrict executive power after 
the crisis passes.  In the case of Japanese internment, this is precisely 
what happened in Ex parte Mitsuye Endo,252 decided at the same time 
as Korematsu.  While the Court was unwilling to declare 
unconstitutional the massive governmental action of evacuating and 
detaining hundreds of thousands of Japanese-Americans, it was 
willing to take the minor step of granting relief on an individual 
basis to those who appealed the legality of their continued 
detention.253  In doing so, the Court left in place the initial evacuation 
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order but planted the seed for further restrictions on governmental 
power to restrict the liberty of a citizen based solely on race, writing: 
A citizen who is concededly loyal presents no problem of 
espionage or sabotage.  Loyalty is a matter of the heart and 
mind, not of race, creed, or color.  He who is loyal is by 
definition not a spy or a saboteur.  When the power to detain 
is derived from the power to protect the war effort against 
espionage and sabotage, detention which has no relationship 
to that objective is unauthorized.254 
The combined agreement of the Executive, Legislative, and 
Judicial branches on the creation of the modern administrative state 
and the unprecedented level of “war powers” exercised on domestic 
soil represents the greatest expansion of executive power in U.S. 
history.  Perhaps because FDR took these actions in the absence of a 
defined “emergency power,” they have had a more lasting impact 
on the separation of powers than any of the emergency actions taken 
by Indira Gandhi or Charles de Gaulle?  This question will be 
addressed more fully in Part VII below, but first let us look at one 
more example of emergency action under the implied powers 
structure of the U.S. Constitution. 
c. George W. Bush and the War on Terror 
President George W. Bush’s actions taken in response to the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the ensuing war on terror 
sparked a renewed interest in executive powers and resulted in 
countless pages of scholarship debating the legality and 
constitutionality of his actions. 255   This Article is not aimed at 
reinvigorating that debate or focused on critiquing the strengths and 
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weaknesses of the various positions staked out.  Rather, this Section 
will simply remind the reader of some of the more public uses of 
emergency power undertaken during the Bush Administration. 
As memos prepared within the Bush Department of Justice 
show, the administration believed that the Commander-in-Chief 
powers and the Vesting Clause of the Constitution provided him 
with the inherent authority to engage in many of these acts.256 
While this overview will be brief, it is important to note that once 
again we see a familiar pattern in response to a national crisis:  The 
legislature, charged with reacting quickly to the needs of the nation 
and the desires of the electorate is often unable or unwilling to 
provide a significant check upon emergency executive action.  While 
the judiciary, with the advantage of time and some protection from 
political pressures, can act as a more appropriate check further 
down the line. 
After the destruction of the September 11th terrorist attacks, 
Congress responded to President Bush’s request for greater 
authority to combat terrorism by passing the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force (AUMF).257  The statute authorized extensive use 
of executive powers including giving the President the authority “to 
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.” 258   While legislators 
eventually began to criticize the Bush administration’s use of this 
delegated authority, they failed to take any affirmative action to 
restrict the sweeping powers granted by the Authorization or other 
similar statutes such as the Patriot Act.259 
The Supreme Court, by contrast, had the advantage of a 
separation in time between the initial crisis triggered by the attacks 
and challenges to executive action.  Additionally, as more time 
passed between each subsequent challenge the Court took steps to 
further restrict executive actions.  The primary example of this 
appears in the Court’s responses to the detention of “enemy 
combatants” housed in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  Detainees were 
initially held in “GITMO” outside of both the judicial and military 
 
 256 Scheppele, supra note 54, at 859. 
 257 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001).  
 258 Id. at § 2(a). 
 259 USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) (“To deter 
and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law 
enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.”). 
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tribunal system. 260   Appeals to this process worked their way 
through the courts and eventually resulted in incremental steps 
restricting executive authority over such individuals.  For example, 
while the Court initially declined to do more than acknowledge 
jurisdiction to hear claims raised by GITMO detainees, 261  each 
subsequent challenge imposed more restrictions on executive 
authority.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,262 the Court required at least some 
type of quasi-judicial proceedings regarding enemy combatants and 
by the time Boumediene v. Bush263 was decided in 2008, the Court was 
willing to declare that detainees were entitled to full judicial review 
of habeas proceedings.  Had the executive merely required approval 
of his actions in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, there would likely 
have been little resistance and executive detentions could have 
continued unchecked.  However, because the U.S. system does not 
remove power from the other branches even when the executive 
uses more of his own, the ability for subsequent review allows for 
protections of civil liberties even if those protections come far too 
late (as, for example, in the aftermath of Korematsu).  
It seems difficult to imagine that either Congress or the Supreme 
Court would have had the ability or political will to deny President 
Bush the use of emergency powers in the immediate wake of 9/11.  
Indeed, Congressional passage of the Authorized Use of Military 
Force indicated a legislative acquiescence to the expansion of 
executive power. 264   Similarly, the Court’s tepid responses to 
executive detentions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba between 2001-2008 
arguably show that the judiciary tacitly assented to Bush’s actions.  
But as time passed and the shock of the initial attacks began to fade, 
the courts became increasingly skeptical of certain executive actions, 
such as executive detentions. 
 
 260 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510-11 (noting that the government 
classified detainees like Hamdi as “enemy combatants” and held them 
“indefinitely—without formal charges or proceedings—unless and until it ma[de] 
the determination that access to counsel or further process [was] warranted”).  
 261 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that federal courts had 
jurisdiction to hear some challenges to detention brought by foreign nationals 
incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay). 
 262  542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that enemy combatants must be given 
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis of their detention). 
 263 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding, among other issues, that enemy combatants 
have the right to challenge their detention under habeas corpus). 
 264 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001) (authorizing the use of the United States military force against those 
responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks). 
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This ability for the various branches of government to have 
multiple opportunities to check executive emergency action is a 
hallmark of an implied emergency powers system and is perhaps 
the most important reason for such a system’s effectiveness in 
preventing executive branch dictatorship.  This claim will be 
examined in the following Part. 
VII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EMERGENCY POWERS 
The selected uses of emergency powers provided above 
demonstrate that a country’s executive will often be required to act 
in extraordinary ways when facing extraordinary circumstances. 
Crises will arise in the lifespan of a nation, and governments must 
react to the threat.  Due to the inherent ability of the executive to 
respond more quickly in these situations, pending national danger 
tends to result in increased executive power.  The wisdom of such a 
system is beyond the scope of this Article.  Rather this Part will 
attempt to answer only the following question:  Does a 
constitutional structure explicitly allowing for the use of emergency 
powers provide better protections for individual liberty and 
separation of powers than a structure lacking such explicit 
allowances?  While valid arguments exist on both sides of the 
question, this Part will argue that the inclusion of an explicit 
emergency powers provision seems to be more susceptible to abuse, 
particularly by an executive faced with an impending loss of power.  
a. Inter-Branch Interaction 
One of the key differences between the U.S. model and an 
explicit emergency power model seems to be the role left for the 
remaining branches of government.  For example, under the French 
model the constitution requires the explicit acquiescence of the other 
branches of government before an emergency can be declared.265 
This “consultation,” however, must happen at the outset of an 
emergency, when fear is at its highest and the political pressures to 
grant sweeping powers to the executive to combat the crisis are 
typically also at their apex.  Under the U.S. Constitution, by contrast, 
 
 265 1958 CONST. art. 16 (Fr.). 
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executive actions taken to confront an emergency do not require 
prior acquiescence from the judicial or legislative branches.  Instead, 
they can be subsequently reversed through legislation or held 
unconstitutional by the judiciary upon review.  This delay between 
the onset of an emergency and when cooperation of the other 
branches is required allows for a “cooling off” period which may 
help counteract the immediate political pressures of the crisis. 
It is possible however, that the passage of time may actually 
benefit the executive if the crisis which inspired the initial 
“emergency” actions continues or worsens.  As we saw with the 
Court’s initial response to the New Deal, the lapse of time between 
action and review may relieve some of the initial “panic” impulse to 
go along with dramatic executive action.266  Then, once it becomes 
clear that the actions enjoy the support of the people, the cooperation 
of the judicial branch can help solidify actions taken outside of the 
traditional understanding of executive powers.  This highlights one 
of the potential dangers of emergency responses without a clearly 
defined procedure delineating when the emergency has ended and 
when the “role” of the executive should return to a non-emergency 
state.  While the danger of such systematic expansion rarely 
materialized prior to World War II, the constant “emergency” of the 
Cold War 267  and then the War on Terror 268  have allowed for 
dramatic expansions of executive power unchecked by a post-
emergency return to the “normal” limits of such power. 
Alternatively, the Indian framework as it existed during the 
“Internal Emergency” granted the executive the authority to declare 
emergencies but made the president responsible to the 
parliamentary government.  Thus, the legislature and the executive 
worked in tandem during declared emergencies, rather than acting 
as a check on each other.  Additionally, emergency declarations in 
India could exempt emergency actions from judicial review for 
violations of civil liberties including wrongful detentions and 
violations of “fundamental rights.”  As discussed above, the High 
 
 266 See supra Section VI.b.i. 
 267 MATHESON, supra note 53, at 9-10 (“The Cold War, which lasted more than 
forty years, was characterized as a constant national security threat to justify 
perpetual crisis measures that contributed to the transfer of power from Congress 
to the President.” (footnote omitted)). 
 268  Id. at 10 (“And the war on terror—an irregular and seemingly endless 
conflict where the ‘world as battlefield’ is the war theater and the enemy wears no 
uniform and is not formally tied to a nation-state—calls for fresh thinking about the 
nature, scope, and duration of our current emergency.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Courts in India attempted to find ways around these restrictions on 
their jurisdiction during the Chinese, Pakistani, and the 1975-1977 
Emergencies.  By the time of the Internal Emergency, however, the 
composition of the Supreme Court had been manipulated into a near 
“rubber stamp” for the Indira Gandhi government.  The Supreme 
Court repeatedly refused to reach the merits of constitutional 
challenges to emergency actions. 
Such an all-out assault on separation of powers would be 
difficult to imagine under the U.S. Constitution.  While the courts 
and Congress have often approved of executive actions or deferred 
to executive judgment (especially in regard to foreign affairs), such 
agreement does not equate to the Indian model which allows the 
emergency government unchecked authority to govern as it sees fit.  
Rather, such agreement can perhaps signal cross-branch agreement 
on the proper course of action or might represent a knee-jerk 
reaction to the immediate crisis, which can later be re-examined as 
conditions change. 
Once again, more recent history provides an appropriate 
example.  In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
Congress passed the AUMF, which granted sweeping powers to the 
President allowing him “to use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks.”269  
As Professor Yoo points out, this grant was “unlimited as to time or 
geography.” 270   The AUMF fell in a gray area between the 
constitutional command that Congress had the sole authority to 
declare war and the constitutional grant of Commander-in-Chief 
powers to the President, essentially giving the President something 
akin to emergency powers at least in the area of counterterrorist 
activity.  While Congress remained technically independent of the 
executive, its initial deference to the executive in times of crisis 
allowed the President the authority to confront the threat of Al 
Qaeda.  The drafting of the AUMF, however, perhaps indicates a 
panicked response to a national threat as the legislation delegated 
essentially unfettered authority to the executive without placing 
corresponding checks on the duration or scope of that authority. 
 
 269 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 
224 (2001). 
 270 YOO, supra note 216, at 411. 
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b. Balance 
Emergency powers may be dangerous but that does not mean a 
country does not benefit from or should not design its constitution 
to produce a strong executive.  For example, while de Gaulle’s use 
of emergency powers threatened the rise of a presidential 
dictatorship, subsequent French experience showed the 
contradictory danger posed by an executive too weak to govern.  
The 1958 Constitution created a five-year term for legislators but a 
seven-year term for the President.271  This gap made it possible for a 
President of one party to have a government of a separate party 
voted in during his term.  While divided government is nothing new 
in constitutional democracies, the manner in which executive power 
was split between the president and the prime minister made it very 
difficult for the government to function effectively during these 
periods of so-called “cohabitation.”272 
The Fifth Republic has experienced several cohabitations since 
1958, during which time the government slipped into a state of near-
paralysis similar to that experienced during the rotating 
governments of the Fourth Republic and even somewhat analogous 
to the impotence of the Reichstag towards the end of the Weimar 
Republic.273  Because the president had the potential to call a state of 
emergency during these periods of stagnation, he tended to have the 
upper hand in pursuing his agenda, at least to some degree.  This 
cycle of showdowns between a president armed with the ability to 
essentially suspend constitutional protections and a government 
with the backing of the latest electorate, eventually led to a 
constitutional amendment in 2000 which changed the term of office 
of the president to five years to match legislative elections.274 
The U.S. model addresses this balance through the creation of a 
“unitary” executive with sufficient authority to address periods of 
crisis without diminishing the powers vested in the other branches 
of government.  Professors Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo 
have compiled an exhaustive look at a particular aspect of the 
Executive Power, the Removal Power, in their 2008 work, The 
Unitary Executive.275  While the authors clearly disclaim an attempt 
 
 271 BOYRON, supra note 126, at 62-63. 
 272 Id.  
 273 Id.; see also supra Part IV. 
 274 See BOYRON, supra note 126, at 67. 
 275 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 255. 
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to discuss the extent of the President’s “war powers,”276 a relevant 
thread emerges which sheds light on the emergency power 
discussion.  The debate over the scope and breadth of the “Executive 
Power” under the U.S. Constitution has consistently involved a 
back-and-forth between the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary.  Regardless of which branch was “winning” the argument, 
the debate itself served, to some extent, to constrain the executive.  
Had the Constitution included an explicit grant of emergency 
powers to the President, this may have potentially altered the 
permanent balance of the argument and served as an “ace in the 
hole” in the debate. 
This “debate” is only an informal restraint on the executive, 
albeit a restraint that has proven fairly effective for nearly two-and-
a-half centuries.  What happens when the executive no longer cares 
about informal checks remains to be seen.  Will the legislature and 
judiciary show sufficient resolve in these cases?  Additionally, 
elections themselves can serve as a check on executive overreach 
and an emergency powers system that does not provide for the 
suspension of elections may, in fact, provide an internal structural 
check.  For example, as professors Steven Calabresi and James 
Lindgren have noted, the U.S. President may be far less powerful 
domestically than is often assumed.277  Because a President’s party 
often suffers electoral defeats in both federal and state off-year 
elections, it can often be difficult for the executive to significantly 
shape domestic policy beyond the first two years of an 
administration even within a system that provides the executive 
extensive emergency authority.278  But this pattern of electoral defeat 
does not have an equally restrictive effect on the Executive’s military 
or foreign affairs powers which are often the most fertile ground for 
emergency powers.  This is especially true as Congress cedes more 
and more of its involvement in military actions to the Executive.  So, 
while elections are a necessary check on the executive, they are not 
necessarily sufficient to prevent extreme executive overreach.  This 
is particularly true if informal barriers such as public approval do 
not deter executive action. 
 
 276 Id. at 20 (“[A]cceptance of the classic theory of the unitary executive does 
not require resolution of the scholarly debate over whether the Article II Vesting 
Clause grants the president a residual foreign affairs power or war power.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 277  Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, The President: Lightning Rod or 
King?, 115 YALE L.J. 2611, 2611-12 (2006). 
 278 Id. at 2612. 
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c. Context and Early Leadership 
Another important point to consider when comparing the 
wisdom of an emergency powers provision with the U.S. model is 
that constitutions are often formed with specific leaders in mind.  
This can lead to failures to adequately define and control certain 
functions of government.  One example of this failure could be an 
overreliance on informal checks on governmental powers.  In 
creating a government designed to appeal to “the best and the 
brightest” there may be a background assumption that the 
government will be led by those who reflect the Framers interest in 
creating a fair and just republic.  In light of such an assumption it 
may also be assumed that informal checks such as precedent and 
reputational constraints will be sufficient to guide and restrain a 
properly civic-minded executive. 
Both the U.S. Constitution and the French Constitution were 
written with an identified first executive in mind.  While de Gaulle 
imposed his will on the constitution of the Fifth Republic and 
essentially tailored it to his understanding of how the government 
should function,279 Washington had a more indirect impact on the 
U.S. Constitution.  Much of the vagueness built into the functioning 
of the Executive can largely be attributed to an understanding that 
Washington would be the first President.280  The Framers (including, 
of course, Washington himself) passed over many of the thornier 
issues regarding executive power which could have upset the 
delicate balance between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists.  They 
did so, confident in the knowledge that the actual role of the 
executive would be shaped by the actions of its first occupant, the 
trusted, steady, and honorable George Washington.281 
As discussed in Part IV, concerns over a Gaullist dictatorship 
impacted the drafting of the 1958 Constitution and led to at least a 
nominally superior role for the Prime Minister’s government.282  Yet, 
largely because of the force of de Gaulle’s personality and the 
opening provided by the emergency powers, the governmental 
structure was transformed.  One could argue that, in some respect, 
 
 279 See supra Part IV. 
 280 YOO, supra note 216, at 53, 70-71. 
 281 Id. at 53 (“A singular factor influenced the ratification of the Constitution’s 
article on the Presidency: all understood that George Washington would be elected 
the first President.”). 
 282 See supra Part IV. 
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emergency powers actually saved the Fifth Republic by allowing a 
charismatic leader to create a more stable Presidential system.  But 
this experience also shows the dangers of granting too much power 
to the executive based on the initial understanding of who will fill 
that role.  Essentially, in the Fifth Republic, a constitution built 
around Parliamentary supremacy was unilaterally turned into a 
strong presidential system in part due to the leverage provided by 
an emergency powers provision. 
d. Controls  
In addition to comparing the experience of countries like the 
United States, Germany, France, and India, another way to compare 
constitutional structures with and without emergency powers is to 
look at (1) what controls are needed to confine executive power in 
both types of systems, (2) what efforts are needed to protect civil 
liberties, and (3) whether the control necessary will inhibit the ability 
of the government to respond to crisis situations.  The simple 
existence of a written constitution purporting to protect individual 
rights and freedom cannot, on its own, limit government overreach.  
If this were the case, the Russian Federation would be one of the 
freest democracies in the world.283  Clearly, more is required, some 
type of checks, either internally or externally, must exist to protect 
individuals from government abuse. 
Mark Tushnet argues that these protections for civil liberties in 
the face of a national emergency most often come from “legal 
controls” or “political controls.”  Professor Tushnet describes these 
controls as follows: 
Legal controls on the exercise of emergency powers rely on 
the courts to determine whether some novel practice violates 
fundamental human rights; political controls rely on the 
interactions among important political actors—including 
political parties, the permanent staffs of executive 
bureaucracies and the people in their capacity as voters—to 
 
 283 See CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION [CONSTITUTION] ch. 2 “Rights 
and Freedoms of Man and Citizen” (guaranteeing, for example, that 
“[f]undamental human rights and freedoms are inalienable and shall be enjoyed by 
everyone since the day of birth”).  My thanks to Professor Calabresi for pointing 
out the extensive protections for individual freedom included in the written 
Russian Constitution but overwhelmingly ignored by its government. 
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produce policies that do not violate fundamental human 
rights.284 
Professor Tushnet argues that political controls provide the best 
protections for civil liberties, even in the face of national 
emergencies.285 
However, when a constitution includes explicit authorization to 
exercise emergency powers which allow the executive to act without 
requiring the cooperation of other political actors and without the 
threat of searching judicial review, the controls proposed by 
Professor Tushnet will not effectively limit potential abuses of 
executive powers.  Legal controls are perhaps more likely to be 
overcome during emergencies.  In Weimar Germany, for example, 
the judiciary surrendered any authority to review the 
appropriateness of a declaration of a state of emergency and 
deferred to the Cabinet’s decision. 286   While the Weimar Courts 
could review the appropriateness of certain individual actions taken 
by an emergency government, they rarely did so.287  Similarly, under 
the French model, the Constitutional Council has little role to play 
once an emergency has been declared and needs only to acquiesce 
at the outset of an emergency.288  Alternatively, under the Indian 
model, the President can strip the courts of jurisdiction to hear 
challenges to certain emergency actions.  As discussed above, the 
courts attempted to continue to provide some type of check on 
government actions during emergency periods, but large numbers 
of cases were found to be beyond review and the Supreme Court 
itself was susceptible to government control.289 
However, it is not clear that the judiciary provides a more 
effective check on emergency actions under the U.S. model, at least 
not while the emergency is ongoing.  Time and again the U.S. 
Supreme Court has upheld executive actions during times of 
national crisis which likely would not have been upheld in calmer 
times and has stepped in to restrict executive authority only once the 
 
 284 Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Parliamentary 
and Separation-of-Powers Regulation, 3 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 275, 276-77 (2007). 
 285  Id. at 277; see also Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency 
Powers: Some Lessons from Hamdan, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1451 (2007). 
 286 See supra Part III. 
 287 See id. 
 288 See supra Part IV. 
 289 See supra Part V. 
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crisis has passed.290  U.S. Courts have proven themselves much more 
likely to disapprove of executive actions when the danger has 
passed and when the cases are less directly connected to military 
action.  But it is precisely during those times when civil liberties tend 
to be most at risk. 
In addition to this delayed response by the courts, the decisions 
of the courts are not always sufficient to check executive power. 
Take the showdown in Ex parte Merryman described above.  Political 
scientists and constitutional scholars have long debated whether 
Lincoln had the constitutional authority to suspend habeas relief.  
Those who think Lincoln exceeded his constitutional authority point 
to the fact that the only discussion of the writ in the Constitution is 
located among the limitations on Congressional powers in Article I 
Section 9, 291  while Lincoln’s supporters point out that there is 
nothing exclusive in the suspension clause. 292   Lincoln’s critics 
respond that the vaunted position of the writ in English common 
law history and its important place as one of the fundamental 
“rights” of Englishmen suggest that it would be odd to include no 
protection of the writ in the Bill of Rights, if there were any way of 
suspending the writ outside of the narrow confines of the 
Suspension Clause.293  Alternatively, supporters have asserted the 
very persuasive argument that the Constitution cannot be 
considered a “suicide pact” and clearly allows efforts to be taken 
which are necessary for the survival of the nation.294 
While this debate has important consequences for our 
understanding of executive power in the U.S. Constitution as a 
 
 290 Compare, e.g., Korematsu v. Unites States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding 
Japanese internments during World War II), and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 
47 (1919) (upholding conviction of anti-government pamphleteer under the 
Espionage Act despite an asserted First Amendment defense), with Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that Guantanamo Bay detainees are entitled to 
habeas relief), Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (finding 
unconstitutional President Truman’s seizure of American steel mills during the 
Korean War), and Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (striking down use of a military 
tribunal to convict a civilian when the courts of the states remained open during 
the Civil War). 
 291 See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 221, at 36. 
 292 YOO, supra note 216, at 224-36. 
 293 Id. at 36-37. 
 294 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 40, at 1257 (“The Constitution itself embraces 
an overriding principle of constitutional and national self-preservation that 
operates as a meta-rule of construction for the document’s specific provisions and 
that may even, in cases of extraordinary necessity, trump specific constitutional 
requirements.”). 
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whole, the relevant point for this Article is that Lincoln’s actions 
defied the “legal controls” then-existing in the constitutional 
structure.  Regardless of whether Lincoln’s actions were 
constitutional or “extra-constitutional,” the entire experience shows 
that legal controls may be altogether insufficient to check executive 
action even in the U.S. model which does not explicitly provide for 
the suspension or suppression of the legal process. 
However, political controls seem more likely to sufficiently 
check the executive in the U.S. model than in the German, French or 
Indian models.  In fact, the inclusion of an emergency powers 
provision often explicitly allows for the silencing of opposition.  In 
1961, de Gaulle prohibited Parliament from debating any of his 
emergency measures and took control of the national airwaves.  
During the Internal Emergency, Indira Gandhi jailed thousands of 
opposition leaders and completely shut down any critical news 
outlets.  It was not political pressure which ended these crisis 
situations but rather a perceived opportunity to gain an advantage 
based on temporary circumstances. 
While similar efforts at censorship have occurred (and have even 
received judicial sanction) in the United States, political opposition 
has often been sufficient to prevent the recurrence of such invasions 
of liberty.295  Additionally, political consequences seem to have a 
much stronger effect on government action in the absence of an 
emergency power provision which can be invoked to suppress 
public opposition.  The Civil Rights Marches moved Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson to action; protests against the Vietnam War 
led to President Johnson’s refusal to seek a third term; and opinion 
polls typically have a significant impact on national policy.  What 
has been fascinating to observe over the course of the Trump 
administration, however, is the ways in which these political 
controls have struggled to play a substantial checking function. 
Whether this is the anomalous result of a Presidential 
administration that seemed somehow immune from the typical 
rules of American politics, or whether the events of the Trump 
administration are a harbinger of a significant decline in the efficacy 
of informal sanctions, remains to be seen.  
 
 295  See, e.g., ROSSITER, supra note 29, at 241-50 (describing the extensive 
censorship of the press employed by Woodrow Wilson during World War I). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
While experience has shown that emergency powers provisions 
lend themselves to powerful executives’ attempts to hang on to 
power, in the face of democratic opposition, history has also shown 
that while necessary, an “energized” executive 296  with sufficient 
authority to confront national crises tends to expand its own power 
incrementally during those same crises.  Once the crisis turns into a 
semi-permanent condition, the potential for a strong executive to 
continue to accumulate power poses a real threat to a separation-of-
powers system based on checks and balances.  While this risk of 
aggregation of power within the executive branch seems to afflict all 
constitutional systems, especially during times of crisis, inclusion of 
an explicit approval of the use of “emergency powers” amplifies the 
risk that the executive will stifle opposition to hold on to authority. 
This is not to say that an implied emergency powers system can 
alleviate this danger.  Rather, it highlights the importance of 
informal checks on executive action in an implied emergency 
powers system.  Because an implied system does not formally 
distinguish between emergency action and non-emergency action, 
many of the important limitations placed on executive power rely 
on informal barriers such as previous practice, public opinion, and 
the threat of public exposure.  Throughout the course of U.S. history, 
these checks have been sufficient to prevent the employment of 
emergency powers to take such actions as suspending elections, 
attempting to dissolve the legislature, or similar measures designed 
to allow the executive to maintain a nearly unlimited hold on power.  
Whether this informal system is superior to the formal barriers that 
are typically included in explicit emergency powers provisions is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  It is important, however, to openly 
acknowledge that these informal barriers are essential to an implicit 
emergency powers system and to commit to defending any 
challenge to these structures just as strongly as we would protect 
formal constitutional requirements.  
 
 296 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (“Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good 
government.  It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign 
attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the 
protection of property . . . to the security of liberty against the enterprises and 
assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.”). 
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